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Preface 
This paper is written as part of the research project «Tilsyn, regulering og kontroll» financed by the 
Norwegian Research Council. It is also part of an international comparative research project 
«Regulating government in a managerial age», headed by professor Christopher Hood, Oxford 
University. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the workshop  «Cross national 
perspectives on control over government» at London School of Economics and Political Science, 
December 13–15 2002. We want to thank the participant at this workshop, the participants at the 
seminar Forvaltningsforum at the Rokkan Center, Tom Christensen, Espen Jamback and Bodil 
Ravneberg for helpful comments.  
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Summary 
The topic of this paper is the changing relations of control between the legislative and executive 
bodies, within executive and within public administration. We outline the traditional way of 
controlling public sector organization in Norway up to the end of the 1970s and describe the main 
changes over the past generation by focusing on the comprehensive administrative reform programs 
and also on the main changes in the control forms of the parliament and introduction of new external 
control from the EU. We discuss how the control has changed the high civil service by focusing on 
the relationship between the parliament and the executive and within the executive. A special analysis 
is conducted of control within two specific policy areas: higher education and prisons.  
The focus is on four basic types of control: mutuality, competition, contrived randomness and 
oversight as broad ways of controlling public sector units. The conclusion is that there seems to be a 
general growth of control over time, first of all because enhanced use of competition and oversight by 
performance assessments. In contrast to what one could expect from the decentralization and 
deregulation components of the New Public Management movement, there seems to have been an 
increase in the formality, the intensity and the complexity of control over the past 10 years.  
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Samandrag 
Dette notatet fokuserer på endringar i kontrollrelasjonar mellom Storting og regjering, innafor 
sentraladminsitrasjonen og i statsforvaltninga. Vi gjer først greie for tradisjonelle kontrollformer i 
norsk offentleg forvaltning fram til slutten av 1970-åra. Deretter blir dei viktigaste endringane i løpet 
av dei siste 20 åra kartlagt  ved å fokusere på moderningseringsprogramma, endringar i Stortingets 
kontrollformer og i nye kontrollordningar frå EU. Vi diskuterer korleis kontrollen har endra seg i 
sentralforvaltninga og i relasjonen mellom storting og regjeringsapparat. Det blir fokusert spesielt på 
endringar i kontrollrelasjonar innafor to policyområde: universitetssektoren og fengselsvesnet.  
Det blir lagt vekt på fire grunnleggjande generelle kontrollformer: kollegakontroll, stikkprøve-kontroll, 
konkurranse og tilsyn. Konklusjonen er at det ser ut til å bli auka kontroll over tid, først og fremst på 
grunn av auka innslag av konkurranse og resultatkontroll. I motsetnad til det ein kunne venta ut frå 
fristillings- og dereguleringskomponentane i New Public Management-reformene, ser det ut til å bli 
auka formalisme, intensitet og kompleksitet i kontrollformene i løpet av dei siste 10 åra.
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Introduction 
In many countries there is a general tendency to put more emphasis on control as well as to move 
away from internal, general control and towards more external, specific and technically based control 
mechanisms. One reason for such changes seems to be the espousal of New Public Management 
(NPM) as a general principle for public administration, although the coupling between the use of 
control instruments and NPM is not clear-cut (Pollitt et al. 1999). NPM features such as structural 
devolution, performance management and contracting out can in practice change the extent, content 
and mixtures of control. The process and effects of increasing and changing control are also 
influenced by other factors, such as adaptation to external pressure arising from increased integration 
in Europe and from a revitalized legislative scrutiny and control. 
The topic of this paper is the changing relations of control between the legislative and executive 
bodies, within executive and within public administration. We focus on the relationship between 
parliament and the executive, between ministers and top administrative leaders within central 
government, and between leaders of different units within high civil service. A special analysis is 
conducted of control within two specific policy areas: higher education and prisons.  
The reason for choosing these different institutional or policy domains is that they may enable us to 
assess the degree of uniformity or diversity of control within the state. The expectation is that prisons 
representing a sector with strong hierarchy and traditionally rule-based bureaucracy loyally will adopt 
and implement top down administrative reforms and new forms of control and regulations. In 
particular we expect this to be the case if the reform and control measures are compatible with 
existing forms. Universities are more autonomous institutions with a strong professional community 
that has a long tradition of resisting attempts at regulation and control from above. Thus we expect 
that the prison system will be more adaptive to new forms of control and regulation than universities. 
High civil service might fall in between these policy areas both because of its power position and the 
nature of its activities. These institutions are closer to politicians and thus more exposed to external 
parliamentary control. We expect them to be able to resist control measures that reduces their own 
power or measures that are incompatible with their activities. 
We will emphasize ex post control and pay less attention to control aspects of ex ante guidance and 
steering both internally within each policy area and externally towards political leadership and the task 
environment. Three main questions will be addressed: What was the nature of the traditional system 
of regulation and control? What has changed in the mix of controls over the past 20 years? How and 
to what extent is the reorganized control and scrutiny function changing the relationship between the 
legislature and the executive, relations within the high civil service and within the public 
administration in the policy area of prison administration and universities?  
The focus is on four basic types of control: mutuality, competition, contrived randomness and 
oversight as broad ways of controlling public sector units (Hood 1996, 1998, Hood et al. 1998). 
Mutuality denotes control of individuals by formal or informal group processes like professional 
collegiality, peer group appraisals and consultation based on egalitarian values. Cooperation is a central 
element of this control strategy. Group interaction is essential both within the agency and between the 
agency and externally. By competition we mean control of bureaucracies by processes of rivalry, like 
rivalry about appointments, pay and resources. New forms of competition in the public sector are 
market testing, outsourcing, contracting out and competition for clients, customers and students. 
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Contrived randomness denotes control of public sector units by making their lives unpredictable in 
some way, like random selection processes, rotation arrangements, and unpredictable patterns of audit 
or inspections. In addition outside control like the media represent a strong element of randomness, 
chance and unpredictability. The fourth generic approach is oversight, which is often linked up with 
the three preceding control forms. Oversight means review, scrutiny and control from above or 
outside public sector organizations and imply a significant element of hierarchy. One classic form of 
oversight represented by legislatures, but a other overseers may also be found in the form of 
reviewers, monitors, independent auditors, inspectors and regulators. New public management 
represents a revitalization of oversight by use of different kind of performance assessments in addition 
to the traditional control with rule following (Hood and Scott 2001). We are interested in the content 
and mixture of these control forms and how they have changed over time and between policy areas.  
The empirical focus of the paper is the changing control in Norway. The last decade has been a period 
of intensive reform of the control and scrutiny functions of the Storting (parliament) and several 
comprehensive modernization programs for public sector have been launched. We draw on existing 
studies and reports on the development of the control and scrutiny function and on administrative 
reforms, and a series of interviews conducted in late 2000 with central political, administrative and 
public company leaders in Norway, 58 in all (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). In addition, we 
interviewed 13 leading officials in the Office of the Auditor General in 2001 and 5 persons in key 
positions at different levels of the prison administration. The section on control of universities has 
been extracted from a comprehensive study of Norwegian university reforms (Bleiklie et al. 2000).  
The paper is organized into six sections. First, in order to do some benchmarking, we describe the 
traditional way of controlling public sector organization in Norway up to the end of the 1970s. Second 
we describe the main changes over the past generation by focusing on the comprehensive 
administrative reform programs and also on the main changes in the control forms of the parliament 
and introduction of new external control from the EU. Third we discuss how the control has changed 
the high civil service by focusing on the relationship between the parliament and the executive and 
within the executive. Fourth, we examine how the mixture of control has changed within the system 
of higher education. Fifth, we focus on the control of prisons. Finally we discuss the contemporary 
control system in Norway by comparing the three institutions or policy areas. 
The nature of  the tradit ional  system of 
regulation and control  
The Norwegian administrative system is a complex body combining partly conflicting principles, 
organization structures, values and mixtures of different control devices. Most of the basic values and 
considerations in administrative policy have been present through the post-Second World War period, 
but the individual components and the emphasis attached to each have changed over time (Lægreid 
and Rolland 1994). There appears to be a cyclical process, whereby development in one direction 
results in a counter-process and sometimes the re-emergence of new values and controls in another. 
In the 1950s and 1960s considerable importance was attached to constitutional law and collective 
standards for appropriateness and justice. The rule of Law, hierarchical structure, formal control and 
traditional bureaucratic procedural methods of administrative control was underlined. The 
Parliamentary Ombudsman for public administration was established in 1962 and a Public 
Administration Act came in 1967. From the mid 1950s a dominant administrative doctrine was that 
the ministries should be relieved of routine tasks, which were administrative and technical in nature, 
and that these should then be transferred to subordinate directorates and agencies. Another important 
doctrine was that the ministries should be developed into secretariat for political leadership. The 
1970s was a period where importance was attached to increased transparency, participation and 
representation through the development of internal workplace democracy in public administration and 
by transferring tasks and responsibilities to a new regional level. The principle of free access to official 
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records was introduced through the Freedom of Information Act in 1970. During this period there 
was a strong political decentralization, rather than strengthening the directorates. County and 
municipal authorities received responsibilities for a number of tasks, which were transferred from 
central government.   
Norway has a long tradition of a homogenous and parliamentary-based political leadership living in 
peaceful coexistence. The political leadership maintained a close connection with administrative 
leadership characterized by strong mutual trust, which  favours incremental administrative reforms and 
control by mutuality. Traditionally central political and administrative actors have agreed on balancing 
political considerations with the value of a rule-oriented civil service, citizen’s rights, transparency, 
equality and the interests of affected parties and codes of professional behavior. There has 
traditionally been a strong political control of government owned-enterp rises in Norway within a 
system of ministerial governance and this went hand in hand with strong structural features and an 
integrated administrative model. Norway has tended to see government-owned enterprises as a strong 
and integrated instrument of political development, organized as government administrative 
enterprises (Grønlie 1998). Historically, the bulk of government administrative enterprises was 
organizationally close to political and administrative leadership and had little autonomy but direct 
access to the leadership. They were defined as part of the central public administration, signaling that 
political control considerations were more important than commercial ones.  
In Norway the control function was for a long time, particularly after World War II, general, and 
passive, allowing the executive a lot of leeway in general decision making and more specifically in 
organizing the central government, an executive prerogative (Christensen and Peters 1999, Roness 
2001, Smith 1997a: 4). This seems to reflect some major features of the political-administrative 
system: a high level of mutual trust between political and administrative leaders and within the public 
administration, strong egalitarian values and common attitudes and norms among politicians and civil 
servants, clear role allocation between the powers and delegation of authority from the legislature to 
the executive (Christensen and Peters 1999, Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). 
Norway has been characterized by a strong statist tradition, incremental changes, the balancing of 
many considerations in civil service and a policy style of peaceful cooperation and revolution in slow 
motion (Olsen, Roness and Sætren 1982). The cooperation between politicians and administration and 
also within the public sector has traditionally been one of cooperation and mutual understanding. 
Norway has thus a consensus-oriented political-administrative system. With its multi-party system and 
minority governments, it is generally characterized by negotiation and compromise in public policy-
making processes. These are all factors that would lead towards control through mutuality. Adding to 
this, the civil service in Norway is, relatively speaking, more homogenous in structure and personnel 
than the civil service in larger countries where the diversity is substantial on both counts. 
Homogeneity in norms, membership and form may make it easier to control administrative 
development processes through mutuality in Norway compared to many other countries.  
Control through mutuality emphasizes the traditions determining how the control and scrutiny 
function is practiced. The control functions are quite informal and general in nature. They may 
traditionally be pursued in a relaxed manner. Norway can be classified as a high context culture, 
meaning that legislative-executive control relations would be more likely to rely on intuitive 
understanding and less on fact -based analytical reasoning and unambiguous causality (Bennett 1990, 
Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 2002). If changing the function to make it more active and formalized 
is typical for NPM-inspired reforms, then the question of compatibility with traditions is particularly 
germane in Norway’s case (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). The approach to control in a political-
administrative culture with strong egalitarian values like Norway will be mutuality by formal or 
informal group processes (Hood 1998). 
Control by oversight sees the control and scrutiny function of the legislature as enacting a mandate of 
popular sovereignty, something that formally gives the parliament the upper hand (Olsen 1983 and 
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1988, Smith 1997a: 5–6). Oversight is particularly associated with formal rights and authority. 
Oversight gives actors at the superior level the right and obligation to direct actors at subordinate 
levels by means of instruction and command, while actors at the subordinate level are obliged to 
follow orders from above (Lægreid and Roness 1999, Roness 2001). Control through oversight under 
a parliamentary system means that the cabinet needs the confidence of and is answerable to the 
parliament. Under minority governments the potential for enacting control is stronger, because it 
permits a kind of «super-parliamentarism», and the political will to use it may be stronger, particularly 
from the opposition. Nevertheless, turbulent parliamentary conditions and changing alliances under 
minority coalition governments may also make control processes more complex and unpredictable for 
the executive. 
In Norway control by oversight and hierarchy is evident through parliamentarism. Norway is also one 
of the few countries in Western Europe where the parliament cannot be dissolved. Norway has, since 
World War II, experienced many parliamentary constellations. From 1946 to 1961, the Labour Party 
had the majority and formed the cabinet alone. Although it lost the majority in 1961, it remained in 
power until 1965. Then came a period of non-socialist majority government, while the last three 
decades have mainly seen minority governments, either non-socialist coalitions or the Labour Party 
alone. 
The effectiveness of executive control by oversight will also depend on the composition of control 
instruments and whether the control function is based in the legislature or not. The Norwegian 
practice is to organize the audit function under the Storting, but as a kind of semi-independent body. 
There is no administrative court, and the political significance of the courts for executive control is 
weak.  
Control through competition, rivalry and negotiations sees the control and scrutiny function less from 
a hierarchical point of view (March and Olsen 1983). There may be many reasons for this. One is that 
parliamentary systems may operate under turbulent conditions, such as when a minority government 
is in power, causing more negotiation among the parties in the cabinet and the opposition, who often 
see the control function as their instrument (Sejersted 2000). Frequent changes of government may 
blur ex post control because the relevant government is out of office when the control is executed. 
But there are also other heterogeneous features that can lead to the effects of parliamentary control 
being a result of rivalry. For one thing, parliaments are complex and specialized, with competing 
parties and committees. In addition, different control instruments may point in different directions 
posing problems of coordination. Heterogeneity in the executive, both within the cabinet and within 
the central government and between the political and administrative leadership, could also be a factor. 
The parliamentary turbulence in Norway during the last two decades could lend particular relevance to 
such a control device. 
The introduction of random control distinguishes between the fact that politicians can engage 
themselves in any matter whatsoever and that they can become engaged in all matters (Lægreid and 
Roness 1999). Due to limited capacity and attention, in practice they may only involve themselves in a 
limited numbers of matters. An element of deliberate unpredictability and the use of chance with 
regard to when and how the politicians intervene and control can compensate for the lack of capacity 
and attention and give them more influence in the control processes. Building an element of 
randomness into the control process can be a feature of organizational design that give the 
participants with the largest attention deficit a possibility to improve their control capacity (Hood 
1998). Thus the introduction of random control, which links an element of chance with the exercise 
of control, might be an effective tool of political control. Randomness has, however, traditionally been 
a less used control method in the Norwegian political administrative system than oversight, mutuality 
and competition. Thus the control and regulation was a mixture of internal collegial mutuality, 
oversight by rule following and competition by negotiations between affected parties within the 
government and with groups outside the public sector. 
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Considering that Norway belongs to a Scandinavian administrative tradition emphasizing the political-
democratic context of the civil service, Weberian values, corporatism and equality, one may expect 
that the civil service will not adapt fully to NPM reforms. 
What has changed?  
T h e  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  r e f o r m  p r o g r a m s  
Over the last two decades the driving forces behind reform in Norway have been relatively weak 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 2001). Despite this, Norway experienced more reform activities in the 
1990s, particularly management by objectives and result (MBOR) and sector-specific reforms 
involving the devolution of public enterprises (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). 
The modernization programs from the mid 1980s emphasized that the public sector had to make 
better use of resources and increase productivity and efficiency. Proposals were made for less control 
and greater autonomy. However, the reform programs gave the impression of being a collection of 
reform ideas rather than a consistent policy. Opposing objectives such as increased autonomy, 
discretion and flexibility on the one hand and enhanced political and administrative control on the 
other were hardly discussed. The programs had initially a strong management approach using 
management by-objectives-technique and structural devolution, and the slogan ‘letting the manager 
manage’ was popular. Later on control components by use of performance management have been 
emphasized more strongly and the use of contracts, marketization and contracting out has become a 
major strategy for the government of today. 
Discussion of NPM reforms began in Norway in the mid-1980s, but the Norwegian reform programs 
then were more a loose collection of on-going reform measures and new reform ideas than a 
consistent, coordinated and unified strategic plan for changing the administrative apparatus (Lægreid 
and Roness 2003). The rhetoric in the modernization programs reflected international trends in 
administrative policy, but it was not very specific concerning reform measures. The reform programs 
promised better service, better utilization of resources, higher productivity, more frequent attainment 
of goals, improved quality, better working conditions for employees, improved political control and 
extended user participation. Even though a vision of market and management-based practices was 
presented in administrative policy documents, its implementation remained optional (Christensen and 
Lægreid 1998; Naschold 1996: 66). The assumption was that the pursuit of economic performance 
should not affect negatively other values like democratic representation, a state based on the rule of 
law and professional quality. Concerns about the implications of the reforms for democracy and 
inequality modified the reform efforts (Lægreid 2001), but in practice there has been a change in the 
balance of different values in favour of efficiency.  
The reform programs of various Norwegian governments thus exhibited more similarities than 
differences. They were pragmatic and cooperative rather than ideological and confrontational, and 
they were directed more at enhancing internal productivity and increasing efficiency than at rolling 
back the state. Reform strategies tended to be sector-based rather than comprehensive. The reform 
style has been maintenance, adjustment and supplementation more than radical change. Some 
elements, like the management components of NPM, have been implemented to a greater degree than 
the market elements (Christensen and Lægreid 1998). 
The Norwegian adoption of NPM through an active administrative policy under the auspices of the 
executive has since the mid-1990s mainly taken the form of increased structural devolution  and the 
introduction of MBOR (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a), a development that also has implications for 
the control function. Structural devolution entails a transfer of authority downwards in the hierarchy 
to new subordinate government organizations, mainly from the central public administration to state-
owned companies, but also to independent regulatory agencies and supervisory authorities. Units and 
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tasks are moved to organizational forms that are further away from the political leadership, implying 
more freedom for devolved agencies and generally weaker potential for control and scrutiny by the 
government and the parliament, but also need for new forms of control and regulation (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2001b).  
MBOR is a steering technique based on formulating specific, consistent and stable goals; on 
developing of reliable and valid performance indicators and feedback systems; and on using the 
information of results and performan ce as incentives to award good results and punish poor 
performance. MBOR entails more flexibility, leeway, autonomy and discretionary power for 
subordinate agencies. Yet, it also gives rise to a more formal and rigid control regime because of the 
extensive use of performance management, contracts or contract-like arrangements. The idea is 
deregulation and less management by rules. Political leaders are supposed to specify targets and 
objectives more clearly, and performance is supposed to be controlled by the use of quantitative 
indicators for monitoring results and for measuring efficiency. The political leadership is expected to 
act as strategic managers by formulating clear goals and assessing results. 
Both structural devolution and MBOR illustrate the hybrid character in NPM coming from the 
centralizing tendencies in contractualism and the decentralizing tendencies in managerialism. NPM is 
thus a double-edged sword prescribing centralization, regulation and control as well as 
decentralization, flexibility and autonomy. What the trade-off will be in practice is an empirical 
question. 
The first NPM-related reform to be implemented in the civil service was MBOR, which was made 
mandatory in 1991 by introducing an annually activity plan for each public sector unit. The aim of this 
reform was to strengthen political control by making goals and means less ambiguous, focusing on 
results, introducing a monitoring system and making greater use of incentives. MBOR has been 
further developed in recent years and more broadly applied. It is now more closely connected to the 
state budget and audit system, less rigid and more adapted to the special features of different public 
organizations. Increased flexibility of the MBOR tends however to reduce the technique as an overall 
control device. Performance auditing has been developed and strengthened since the mid-1990s 
(Christensen, Lægreid and Roness 2002) and a comprehensive model for performance management 
was installed into the new Government Financial Regulations in 1996 (Helgesen 2001). This includes a 
letter of allocation, which is a contract like arrangement between the ministry and subordinate 
agencies on recourses, specification of objectives and performance indicators, and introduction of a 
formal steering dialogue between the ministries and agencies throughout the year. Norway also 
introduced a pay-for-performance system for top administrative leaders in the early 1990s including 
individual contracts and annual assessment of the director generals by the secretary gen erals and the 
secretary generals by the ministers. This system was implemented more reluctantly than anticipated, 
partly because of cultural resistance. Especially it has been difficult to involve the politicians in the 
performance assessments. Pay for performance is now more differentiated than before, but still less 
differentiated than in other countries, and is ambiguous how tight the connection is between pay 
bonuses and individual performance (Lægreid 2001).   
The Norwegian reform process is mainly a co mbination of internal delegation of authority combined 
with a more formalized performance assessment regime and external structural devolution. During the 
last 10 years, about 50 units changed their organizational status in the direction of more devolution, 
which accounts for new forms of state-owned corporations with more market competition and 
commercial freedom and less political control (Christensen and Lægreid 2001b). Until 1992 major 
public activities like railways, telecommunication, power, postal services, forestry, grain sales and 
public broadcasting were organized as central agencies or government administrative enterprises. 
Since then, the commercial parts of these enterprises has been corporatized, meaning established as 
different types of state owned companies, while the regulatory parts have retained the agency form. As 
a result more autonomous regulatory and controlling agencies have been established. The single 
purpose organization model replaces the old integrated civil service model where the roles as owner, 
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regulator, controller, purchaser and provider were conducted within the same organization. Still, there 
has been reluctance to privatise, although Norway has experienced some recent breakthroughs. 
Telenor, the national telephone company, sold 17 percent of its shares to private investors in 2000, 
and Statoil, the large public oil company, is also partly privatised as of 2001. 
There are however important distinctions between the Norwegian reform programs and the main 
trends in the international administrative policy reform movement (Olsen 1996). First, visions of the 
decline of the public sector through privatisation scarcely featured in the Norwegian reform programs 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998). Second, international criticism that the growth of powerful special 
interest organizations had prevented political institutions from addressing broader national concerns 
did not receive much support in Norway. Third, the changes in practice turned out to be more 
pragmatic and more constrained by established administrative cultures than in many other countries. 
In other words, Norway has chosen a moderate reform path, trying to balance devolution with central 
political control and making moderate changes in the execution of central political and administrative 
functions  (Christensen and Lægreid 2001a). This makes Norway a deviant case, with increasing public 
expenditure, growing numbers of public employees and a comparatively low profile for NPM 
discourse and initiatives. This pattern should be seen in the light of Norway’s current economic well 
being, a strong welfare state tradition with a firm footing among the electorate, strong public-sector 
trade unions and polity features resulting in weak minority governments.  
A mixture of symbols and rhetoric, on the one hand, and pragmatic and instrumental means and 
measures, on the other, have characterized the reform programs in Norway. The three latest programs 
illustrate this. The Bondevik  I (center) government’s program in 1999 of simplifying Norway included 
three main initiatives. First, simplifying government regulations in the business sector by making rules 
and regulations less complicated to comply with. Second, enhancing citizen- and user-oriented 
development of the public administration. The government decided that all public agencies should 
have a service declaration, the Norwegian version of Citizen Charter, by the end of the year 2000 
(Stene 2001). Third, simplifying government regulations concerning the municipalities via 
decentralization and allowing more resources to be spent on service production and fewer on 
reporting and compliance with central government regulations. The catchwords were management, 
democracy, user-orientation, transparency, readjustment and service.  
The main ideas of this program were adopted by the Stoltenberg  (Labor) government that followed, 
which stated three targets for its program of 2000 for innovation of the public sector in Norway. First, 
that organization and service delivery should be based on user needs. Second, that resources must be 
transferred from administration to service production and third, that there should be a more effective 
use of resources and greater latitude at all levels. The overriding aim of the program was the 
revitalization, renewal, adjustment and increased efficiency of public administration and its adaptation 
to the needs of citizens and to economic considerations. Added to this was a list of more concrete 
sector-specific reform initiatives, like establishing «one-stop-shops» in all municipalities; e-
government; and the reorganization of the police administration, the court system, the health care 
system and the universities.  
The current Bondevik II government (center-conservative) more aggressively and ideologically 
oriented tries to further market principles and competition. Lead by the minister of labour and 
government administration, a professor in economy, the government emphasizes more structural 
devolution of state-owned enterprises, including partial privatisation, more clear division and 
organizational separation of roles and functions (owner, regulator, purchaser, provider), more 
contracting-out and out-sourcing of services and more delegation of authority to sub-ordinate levels 
and institutions. The slogan «From words to action» indicates a wish to weaken the symbolic elements 
of administrative reform and to enhance the substantive outcome (Christensen and Lægreid 2003). 
Within this context the Norwegian public administration has been gradually reformed during the past 
two decades. Many small steps and more pace in the reform efforts during the last five years have 
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added up to a public sector with significant differences compared to 15 years ago. It has become more 
flexible, more complex and management models from private sector have supplemented the 
traditional Weberian inspired public administration model.  
Norway is a latecomer in the New Public Management movement having a pragmatic and incremental 
reform style  (Olsen 1996). The label «reluctant reformer» is a less characteristic for the Norwegian 
case now than up to the mid 1990s. Despite quicker pace in the reform efforts during the last five 
years, Norway is still a deviant case compared to other OECD countries, and this makes Norway an 
interesting case for studying implication of administrative reforms on regulation and control. 
O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  –  t h e  S t o r t i n g  
a n d  t h e  E U  
The mainstay of control of the executive by the legislature is the principle of ministerial responsibility. 
This principle implies that the minister is politically responsible to the Storting for everything that 
goes on in his or her ministry and its subordinate agencies and is thus accountable for how the 
administration performs its functions and tasks (Smith 1997a). The principle of ministerial  
responsibility is often stated as «the Storting knows only the minister», meaning that the administrative 
leadership traditionally has very little exposure to parliament (Sejersted 2000). The role of the 
administrative leadership is, therefore, above all to be loyal – on the one hand refraining from public 
criticism of political leaders and on the other allowing them to take credit for political achievements 
and shielding them from blame if they make mistakes (Jacobsen 1960, Smith 1997a: 6). As the political 
process becomes more complex and involves more devolution and managerial discretion, the principle 
of ministerial responsibility becomes increasingly difficult to apply in practice, but there has been little 
interest in revising it. In practice, however, there is a growing tendency for top civil servants to be 
more exposed and accountable, a development that challenges the principle of ministerial 
responsibility. 
An important reform of the control function of the Storting was the establishment of a new  Standing 
Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs in 1993 (Roness 2001). The committee was designed with 
an active profile and is the only standing committee with the authority to actively request information 
from the civil service in certain cases. This change resulted in a heated debate about how far the 
parliament could go in demanding information and how far the executive should go in offering 
information to the Storting. Even though the new permanent committee has an active profile, one 
major weakness is that it has very limited resources for independent scrutiny and control, something 
that reflects a reluctance towards building up counter-expertise in the Storting. The committee has 
only two committee secretaries. 
In 1995, as a temporary measure, the standing committees were for the first time allowed to conduct 
public hearings. Previously, all hearings in the committees in the Storting had been closed to the public 
(Nordby 2000: 265, Smith 1997a: 7). There are two categories of public hearings: information hearings 
(ex ante) and control hearings (ex post). The justification for both types of public hearings are that 
they should contribute to transparency and encourage deliberation and dialogue with the general 
public, thus increasing the legitimacy of the decision-making and control processes (Paulsen 2000). 
The majority of most high-profile hearings have since then been conducted by the Scrutiny 
Committee. By mid-2001 there had been 17 public hearings, of which the Scrutiny Committee had 
conducted 8. However, only 7% of all hearings in 2000 were public (Innst. S. no. 284 (2000–2001)). In 
2001 public hearings were made a permanent feature.  
The Storting has a long tradition of posing questions in plenary sessions as an instrument of control. 
A weekly Question Time was introduced in 1949, where the minister had to answer questions 
submitted in advance; thereafter, parliamentary questions were used quite extensively as a means of 
controlling the executive (Rasch 1996). In 1996 this arrangement was supplemented by a spontaneous (or 
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oral) Question Time, where certain ministers (rotating weekly) have to answer questions without prior 
notice. This has added an unpredictability element and some randomness into the question time. 
Since 1918 the Office of the Auditor General has been located outside the executive, reporting to the 
Storting. The traditional profile of the audit organization has been annual financial auditing, and it has 
generally worked in isolation from the parliament. A watershed in the pract ice of performance auditing 
came with the establishment of a separate division for this function in 1996 (Gunvaldsen and Karlsen 
1999). While the parliament had traditionally paid little attention to the financial audit, now the 
performance audit fairly often formed the basis for conducting public hearings and for initiatives 
taken by the Scrutiny Committee towards the executive (Sejersted 2000). This development was also 
enhanced by the introduction of a new document series in 1993, through which the Audit Office 
could present performance audits case by case to the Storting. This gave the Scrutiny Committee new 
opportunities for control. For the last three years, on average, 12 performance audits have been 
submitted annually to the Storting. Before 1993 performance audits were normally submitted once a 
year, together with the financial audits. This development indicates that the Storting is spending more 
time and energy on control matters especially on those initiated by the Audit Office representing an 
externalisation of the parliamentarian control, but also that the Audit Office may have become less 
independent through a parliamentarisation of the auditing function (Sejersted 2002).  
Generally speaking one may conclude that control and scrutiny of the execu tive by the parliament is 
now greater than has traditionally been the case in Norway. In addition, the way this control is 
organized and what it entails has also changed (Sejersted 2000). More emphasis is now put on major 
individual cases, which often evolve into «scandals», and less on routine control (Nordby 2000: 265–
266). Put differently, there is less «police control» and more «fire alarms» and «legislative freelancing» 
(Aberbach 1989, Gormley 1989, McCubbings and Schwarts 1984)). 
In addition to administrative reforms and the revitalization of the legislative control function the 
control over public sector has also been affected by the Norway’s increased integration into Europe 
through the EEA (European Economic Area) agreement. The EEA agreement, which  came into 
force in 1994, requires Norway to follow EU rules governing the internal market for goods, services, 
labour and capital, even though it is still outside the formal decision-making structure of the EU. A 
special unit, the EFTAs Surveillance Authority (ESA) has been set up to monitor the fulfilment of the 
obligations under EEA. The authority is to ensure that the EEA rules are properly implemented in the 
domestic public administration and that the national authorities correctly apply them. The NPM-
reforms and the EU-adaptation seem to be inter-linked. The EU policy towards market competition 
and deregulation are at the heart of NPM. EU puts a normative pressure on the domestic 
administration and also more directly demands certain ways of organizing and controlling public 
apparatus to secure competition, like more focus on oversight by the court system and establishment 
of autonomous control agencies. 
Summing up, developments during the last decade show a political will to strengthen the control 
funct ion of the Storting towards the executive. This gives the Storting more scope for making sure 
that government and public administration follow up on parliamentary decisions and intentions 
(Rommetveit, forthcoming). At the same time administrative reforms that focus more on devolution 
and MBOR together with increased integration in Europe through the EEA agreement imply new 
challenges for the control function. These diverging trends may produce a paradoxical situation of 
increasing parliamentary control over a narrower sphere. 
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Control  of  High Civi l  Service 1 
In this section, drawing chiefly on our interview data we will first describe and discuss the effects of 
changing external control of the executive through reorganization of parliamentary control 
mechanisms and through increased integration in EU. We then go on to discuss the effects of 
administrative reforms focusing especially on structural devolution and MBOR.  
E f f e c t s  o f  e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l :   L e g i s l a t i v e  c o n t r o l  
a n d  E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n  
Revitalization of parliamentary control. The new standing committee on scrutiny  has revitalized the 
control function of the parliament. Since the mid-1990s the committee has shown a greater interest in 
audit reports, their recommendations have been more comprehensive and less unanimous and floor 
debates have attracted more participants. A strong control wave occurred in the Storting in the period 
1993–1997 (Sejersted 2002, Søreng, 2002). The result is more political attention and parliamentary 
interest towards the control function generally and towards the audit reports specifically. Among our 
respondents the ministers are quite divided in their attitudes towards the committee. About half of 
them think revitalizing the committee was a good move and they fully support the committee’s taking 
more initiatives towards the executive than before. They also report that this is an important step in 
making ministers and civil servants generally more aware of the accountability issue, and they believe 
the committee is helping to make the activities of the executive and civil service more transparent. The 
other half of the ministers holds quite the opposite view. They are sceptical towards the new 
committee, because they fear a more politicised control function and perceive this as the current 
reality. They also suggest that the committee lacks self-discipline and they think there are too many 
personal or political crusades, whereby certain ministers are attacked and the general focus is on the 
people involved rather than the matter at hand. In their view the committee’s initiatives often lack 
substance and they see its status as ambiguous, combining the roles of prosecutor, investigator, judge 
and «prejudge». 
The decision to introduce public hearings in the Storting in 1995 was taken after a heated debate and 
with a majority of only one vote, and many felt that such a reform was culturally incompatible with 
the traditions of the legislative-executive relationship. The move broke a long tradition of closed 
committee hearings. However, when public hearings were made a permanent feature in 2001, none of 
the legislators wanted to remove this arrangement and a large majority wanted to expand it. The 
responses on this issue in our survey were highly emotional and polemical, indicating problems of 
adaptation. One very frequently mentioned argument is that the hearings are often too long, do not 
have a clearly defined purpose and are often characterized by the «accused» minister appearing to take 
the blame without really taking it. Another frequent argument is that the parliamentarians often reveal 
their lack of familiarity with the case and insufficient expertise in complicated cases. A third set of 
arguments is that the hearings reveal that it is difficult to respond with appropriate sanctions to 
ministerial malpractice or incompetence. While dramatic measures, like impeachment, are often 
inappropriate and difficult to apply once a minister has left office, criticism without further 
consequences is considered too mild. A fourth type of argument is that the hearings are often laden 
with political symbols, directed at the media, resulting in the matter being blown out of proportion 
and in parliamentarians using executive leaders as scapegoats instead of taking some of the 
responsibility themselves. 
One main positive argument is that the hearings are demanding and exacting for the parliamentarians, 
the ministers and the civil servants, thus keeping them on their toes. Another common view is that 
                                                                 
1 This session is mainly based on Christensen, Lægreid and Roness (2002). 
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public hearings lead to more transparent decision-making and provide new information that sheds a 
broader light on various issues and policies. The hearings simplify and make political processes more 
accessible to the general public and show that they are not exclusively the domains of experts. A third 
argument is that the hearings have a learning effect and therefore have some preventive impact and 
contribute to an increase in collective accountability.  
There are clear differences between the groups of respondents in both their experiences and opinions. 
The ministers gen erally have a more positive attitude than the other groups towards public hearings. 
They are also the only group that is overall more positive than negative. It is, however, interesting to 
note that ministers who have been directly involved in the hearings are more negative than the other 
ministers.  
The reactions of ministers to spontaneous question time was mostly positive, reflecting the fact that many 
of them have long parliamentary experience and feel able to handle this type of encounter. Their main 
argument is that this is a good and demanding innovation. It sets higher standards for both 
parliamentarians and the ministers, vitalizes the Storting and leads to better debates and a good 
political arena. The negative comments were that the ministries spent too much time preparing for 
these types of questions that it was stressful for ministerial officials, that some of the questions did not 
have much political value and that some political issues did not lend themselves to a spontaneous 
response. Especially ministers without experiences as members of the parliament were critical to the 
spontaneous question time. 
Norway has the largest Office of the Auditor General in Scandinavia, including 450 positions of which 120 
works in the departments of performance auditing. Since the establishment of the performance audit 
department there has been an increased focus on performance audit in the Office of the Auditor 
General. The performance audit departments are mainly filled with people trained in the social 
sciences. By the end of 2000 it had submitted 36 performance audit reports to the Storting. In 2000 
work was carried out on 46 examinations of performance audits. Currently, close to one fifth of the 
resources of the audit office are used on performance audit. Performance audits include a systematic 
evaluation of the economy, efficiency and the achievement of targets based on the Storting’s 
resolutions and intentions. The audit office is supposed to obtain all information required by the 
Storting regarding the implementation and effects of public measures. In contrast to the input focus 
of the traditional financial audit, the performance audit is more output-oriented. The ambition is to 
move beyond the issues of compliance and to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
programs. Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that many of the performance audit reports are still 
more compliance -oriented than performance-oriented (Pollitt et al. 1999). 
When asked about how they have generally experienced the changing role of the Office of the Auditor 
General, the ministers were more positive than the administrative leaders, saying the revitalization of 
the audit function was necessary, even if potentially unpleasant. The negative arguments are that the 
new role is too extensive and ambiguous, particularly in relation to the delicate balance between the 
Storting and the executive. The secretary generals, in particular, stress this negative argument. The 
second negative argument from the administrative leaders is that the new audit procedures are 
problematic because audit reports are made public before the ministries and civil service have a 
chance to comment on them or correct mistakes, something that suggests that this might be a way of 
increasing the visibility of the audit organization.  
Most cabinet members were positive towards performance auditing, while most secretary generals 
were very negative. The cabinet members’ main argument is that performance auditing is positive 
because it is important to follow up on decisions, correct problems of policy implementation while it 
is in progress and point to effects. The secretary generals argued that the audit organization has not 
mastered its new role and that it is problematic to audit policies and decision-making processes while 
they are still going on. Some also think that the audit function has been politicised by this 
development. Another argument is that performance audits demand too much attention from the 
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ministries and that the audit office lacks the competence for the job. They also complain that the 
auditors are not critical enough in choosing projects, make mistakes that they are reluctant to correct 
and are apt to jump to unfounded conclusions. A revitalized Audit Office focusing more on 
performance auditing has produced increased tension between the Audit Office and the Government. 
The Government fear that an active Audit Office will expand into becoming an audit agency for the 
Government and not only for the legislature and it also wants to reduce the Audit Office access to 
internal documents. 
As for the Audit Office itself, it is trying to obtain legitimacy through a professionalisation of 
performance auditing. It has recruited university trained people, invested a lot of resources in 
developing new auditing standards and guidelines, developed new methods for performance auditing 
and brought itself into line with international professional standards of «best practice» in performance 
auditing. In the auditing process, it is in a close dialogue and consultation with the audited units both 
on the auditing criteria and the facts (Christensen, Helgesen and Lægreid 2001). Thus the Audit Office 
tries to introduce some elements of mutuality into the performance auditing process.  
In spite of this, there seems to be a lot of leeway and discretion in interpreting the resolutions and 
intentions of the Storting, and there is a potential danger that the Audit Office, through performance 
auditing, will move into an ambiguous grey zone between professional independence and objectivity 
on the one hand and political debate on the other hand. The auditors say they try to maintain a 
balance between being subordinated to the Storting and being an independent auditing agency. They 
make strong efforts to appear as objective and neutral as possible. Almost without exception 
performance audit examinations are formally conducted on their own independent initiative, but at the 
same time they are highly sensitive and responsive to signals from the Storting and the informal 
network between the Audit Office and the Storting has become closer. Generally the Storting’s 
confidence in and satisfaction with the Audit Office is very high and the respect for the Audit Office 
is generally strong both in the Storting and among the ministers. 
The performance reports from the Audit Office normally focus on steering control, meaning how to 
improve the efficiency and working methods of the administration. However, when audit reports are 
debated in the Storting, the focus tends to move to the question of ministerial responsibility, the 
confidence of the Storting in the executive and on how to blame the minister and make him/her 
political responsible. Thus, control through the performance audit is normally an arena for the 
parliamentary opposition. This does not, however, imply that the Scrutiny Committee disagrees with 
the Audit Office reports. Normally it does not, a fact that may indicate that the Audit Office actually 
more often determines the political agenda of overworked MPs than the other way around.  
The emergence of performance audits might imply a change in the role of the Office of the Auditor 
General from that of an objective inspector towards that of a political actor, thus producing new 
tension between the executive body, the legislative body and the audit organization. A purist view of 
audit independence is difficult to defend in a situation where the producers of audit reports scrutinize 
activities that are inherently sensitive and then produce policy or political audits (Grasso and 
Sharkansky 2001). To balance independence and sensitivity to political signals is a delicate challenge.  
Summing up, the cabinet members and top civil servants’ overall experiences concerning the effects of 
the new control role of the Storting are generally more negative than positive for all groups. There is, 
however, some variation regarding what effects the different groups perceive. The ministers believe 
that increased control makes the civil service more exposed, reluctant and anxious, resulting in more 
careful documentation of their activities and more internal control, which binds a lot of resources. On 
the positive side is the fact that the Storting has strengthened its position through increased control 
and has become more aware of how it handles various polici es. The cabinet can now more openly 
describe the uncertainties of various programs and policies and the civil service can, therefore, be 
more alert. The ministers see little increase in negative attitudes towards politicians among civil 
servants as a result of the increased control. 
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The secretary generals share most of the overall views expressed by the cabinet members. They add 
that the civil servants are more exposed than before and that more issues are brought onto the 
political level as a result of increased control. The agency and company directors stress that increased 
control has created more work for their organizations and increased ambiguity. They express more 
critical attitude towards the politicians and one reason for this being their participation in public 
hearings in the Storting. 
Effects of increased integration in Europe. Norway has, without reservation, accepted more 
than3,000 pieces of legislation or regulation emanating from the EU. Through the EEA, the Storting 
is involved in the European legislative process in a consultative capacity. All EEA matters are 
scrutinized in what is essentially an expanded version of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
This arrangement reflects the view that EEA issues belong in the domain of foreign relations, a view 
that is becoming increasingly obsolete and misleading because of the emergence of transnational 
relations extending beyond intergovernmental relationships, controlled by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and into other ministries and further into central agencies and authorities  (Jacobsson, Lægreid 
and Pedersen 2001a, Narud and Strøm 2000). 
The conception of EEA matters as a branch of foreign affairs is important, because such matters, 
constitutionally speaking, are the prerogative of the executive, so the Storting is reluctant to instruct or 
control the cabinet in foreign policy matters. Overall, the ability of the Storting to control government 
activity in EU matters is rather limited. The Commission carries out surveillance of the 
implementation of common rules on the one hand and the ESA on the other, and by more use of 
courts and judicial control than is common in the Norwegian tradition. 
The EEA agreement means a massive transfer of real power from the Storting to EU institutions, 
which has weakened the Storting and strengthened the government and the administration as well as 
the courts (Sejersted 1996). The establishment of independent agencies for control and regulation in 
many policy areas might have strengthened the administrative control. In some respects the EU seems 
to be a «bureaucrats’ paradise», where officials and civil servants are the central actors. Politicians are 
thus frequently relegated to the role of «hangers-on» in EU issues. There is a danger that if the 
administration is not controlled it will become increasingly dominant. The implication is a control 
deficit indicating that politicians will have to take responsibility for matters over which they have less 
and less control (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2001b).  
On the other hand the process of Europeanization has weakened the control function of the Storting. 
Generally speaking, the Storting does not play a particularly important role in EU matters, and as a 
result of integration in the EU the Storting risks relegation into an even more subordinate position 
(Raunio and Wiberg 2000). This development is going on in all EU countries but is especially relevant 
for Norway with its intermediate «EU-light»- connection through the EEA agreement. 
It is generally difficult to involve the politicians in the EU-related tasks, especially when it comes to 
«low-politics» involving standardization, regulation and implementation of directives. Generally the 
constraints coming from the EU are reducing the control space for domestic political leaders. The 
issues move from a domestic to a supra-national or transnational sphere and so do part of the control 
apparatus. In the Norwegian case the ESA has become an important, active and controversial 
controlling unit (Graver and Sverdrup 2002), and new forms of regulation and control emerge.  
E f f e c t s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e f o r m s  
The main argument for structural devolution  is that it provides enhanced and clearer control of public 
companies and gives them more freedom to compete on markets and earn money for the government 
(Boston et al. 1996). It seems, however, that it is easier to obtain more freedom than clearer control. 
Among our respondents, very few of the executive leaders said that political control of companies had 
been strengthened or even maintained through devolution. On the contrary, the majority of ministers 
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and company leaders reported that political control had decreased. The same effect is reported from 
the managers within the devolved companies (Wik 2001). In other words, the distan ce between 
politicians and companies has widened and political control has weakened in practice (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2001b). At best it is more control over less. The main lesson is that structural devolution 
means a decrease in political authority and the capacity for exercising control and less attention to 
political considerations in state owned companies. We have moved from a period when the debate on 
regulation was about the balance between corporate autonomy and political governance, to a situation 
where the motive behind the devolution of public enterprises is to make the government abstain from 
politics and become a professional investor and contribute to more competition and market-like 
arrangements (Grønlie 2001). It is now more explicitly concerned with contracts for securing sector 
specific policy issues or collective interests, something that is pushing such considerations into the 
background, particularly when efficiency is favoured and resources are scare. There is a process going 
on to splitting ownership between portfolio minister and the minister of trade and industry. Structural 
devolution has changed the trade-off between corporate autonomy and political control. Market 
power has been strengthened and political steering has decreased. 
The approach of the Storting to state-owned companies is, however, rather ambivalent, something 
that seems to make the role of the executive more tension-ridden. The Storting seems both to want to 
give the companies more autonomy, based on structural devolution, and at the same time to retain 
some control over them, for instance by introducing more active corporate control. Through its 
corporate control work, the Office of the Auditor General ascertains whether a minister has fulfilled 
his duties as an administrator of the interests of the state in public companies in accordance with the 
Storting’s resolutions and intentions. This corporate control was introduced in the late 1960s and has 
been strengthened since. It is, however, a narrower type of audit than the auditing of agencies within 
the public administration (Grønlie 1989, Thompson 2001). 
Structural devolution or agencyfication implies greater discretion to agency and company leaders 
without political interference in their daily operations. Structural devolution gives managers and 
executive officers more resources, tasks and responsibility and leads to less capacity and legitimacy for 
political governance and control. New forms for control systems develop. One is the establishment of 
more autonomous agen cies for control and regulation. Another is to control by more use of contracts. 
The new control system is more formal and complicated than before and thus more time and resource 
consuming. It is less based on mutual understanding, trust and common norms and values than 
before. Adding to this are cultural changes giving the politicians less leeway in using the new formal 
control devices. One main reason for this is that new norms of non-interference from the politicians 
in the operation of public companies and agencies. Trying to imitate private sector management 
causes ministerial «hands-off» policy. But at the same time there are indicators of informal control 
along traditional lines. Thus agencification and corporatisation in Norway seem to have created a 
hybrid, reflecting the different control dimensions. Under structural devolution indirect forms of 
political control through procedural rules and regulative authority should replace direct interference in 
day-to-day activities and individual cases.  
With MBOR, too, it has proven easier in practice for politicians to fulfill the autonomy components 
than the control elements, at least up to the late-1990s (Matland 1991, Ørnsrud 2000). One of the 
most critical aspects of MBOR is the interface between politics  and administration. In practice, 
MBOR works better as an administrative control device towards subordinate agencies than as a 
measure of better political control (Christensen and Lægreid 1998). Political leaders have a mixed 
attitude towards MBOR, approving of it in principle as a control mechanism but in practice not acting 
in accordance with MBOR assumptions. In a compromise culture like the Norwegian one, with weak 
minority governments, it is difficult for politicians to formulate clear, consistent and stable objectives, 
and it is thus difficult for them to formulate result indicators and conduct performance assessments 
and result evaluations. This is true for two of the areas where the MBOR is most often applied – 
budgetary and financial management and pay policy (Helgesen 2001, Lægreid 2001). They represent 
CHANGING GOVERNMENT CONTROL  IN  NORWAY NO T A T  2 - 2003  
   21
contract -like arrangements in ministry-agency relations primarily between administrative leaders on 
different levels, and in practice the MBOR arrangements have proven to be more a device for 
enhanced administrative accountability than for improved legislative-executive control.  
The system of management by objectives and results has been hard to fulfill in practice due to 
difficulties in isolating outcomes and rewarding good performance. There is a tendency to assess 
activities and output rather than outcome (Helgesen 2001, Ørnsrud 2000). In practice the system is 
more a bottom-up process where the objectives and performance indicators are formulated by the 
agencies themselves and then approved by the politicians, than a top-down-process with the premises 
going from the political leadership and downwards in the hierarchy. One lesson that might be learned 
is the instrumental weakness of the contract reform concept. Performance contracts normally promise 
more than they can deliver, they look better ex ante than ex post. Another lesson is that it is difficult 
for the politicians to live up to the demands of the contract system, which states that the role of the 
political leadership is to formulate general long-term strategic goals, and to access results. One 
implication of this is that it might develop two parallel sets of steering and control, one proactive 
model based on the strict managerial MBOR technique and another reactive based on a political logic 
where the politicians get the opportunity to interfere in political tasks in a more random and ad hoc 
manner (Brunsson 2002, Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The reactive policy style is also enhanced by 
more active and random interference from the Storting and form media (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). More aggressive and unpredictable mass media is a result of the deregulation of the media 
sector in the 1980s. Another implication is that the MBOR in practice become modified and end up in 
combination with rule steering as «result-oriented-rule-steering» (Christensen and Lægreid 1998, 
Nashold 1996). While Norwegian civil servants are preoccupied by MBOR reforms, they have resulted 
in less change than expected, and they are often modified according to administrative traditions. 
Moreover, politicians have found it hard to get to grips with their new role of stating unambiguous 
goals and using information about the results for control and steering.  
It is difficult to live up to the instrumental ideals of the MBOR. In spite of this the control technique 
is extensively taken into use. There seems however to have developed two sets of control and 
governance. Firstly, MBOR rooted in an administrative logic and which works as a control method 
between administrative leaders at different levels. In practice MBOR is more a technique for 
administrative steering and control than a device for enhanced flexibility and local autonomy, even if 
this balance varies between policy areas as the prison case illustrate. Secondly, political control rooted 
in a political logic and loosely coupled to MBOR. The politicians are little interested and involved in 
formulating of performance indicators, performance reporting and evaluating of performance. They 
have a reactive approach and are more preoccupied with launching new programs than with evaluating 
the results of previous reforms. The administrative leaders get more formal instruments of control at 
their disposal. This change their roles, control potential and actual influence. MBOR including new 
forms of strategic planning, agency control, financial regulations, performance budgeting and 
performance pay systems consists first of all of devices for administrative leaders. Political leaders are 
at arms length distance from these control methods and this implies that more discretions and control 
are transferred to the administrative sphere.  
D i s c u s s i o n  
The increased scrutiny and control exercised by the Storting towards the executive in Norway over the 
last decade, obviously a hierarchical measure focusing on oversight, seems primarily to reflect 
increased parliamentary turbulence and the influence of modern reforms like New Public 
Management. Both the increase in control and the instruments used run counter to Norwegian 
cultural traditions concerning this aspect of the legislature-executive relationship, which traditionally 
has been characterized by passivity, trust and informality. Generally speaking, cabinet members, top 
civil servants, agency leaders and CEOs of state owned companies are more negative than positive 
about the increased emphasis on control by the Storting.  There are, however, some marked 
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differences among the groups of respondents. The secretary generals are generally very dissatisfied 
with the new control function, as are,  to a lesser extent, agency and company directors, while the 
members of cabinet had the most positive things to say about it. The differences between the groups 
may be explained in terms of differences in perspective. Among the ministers, most of whom have 
had a long parliamentary career and have gone back to the Storting after quitting as ministers, there 
seems to be greater acceptance of increased hierarchical control by the Storting, even though they are 
critical of some of the new instruments of control through oversight. The agency directors, and most 
especially the state company directors, seem to be far more critical towards increased control, because 
autonomy is a more important issue for them. 
The reactions of administrative leaders can be interpret ed using a mixture of competition and 
mutuality. They are more preoccupied with the division of labour between the executive and the 
parliament, in the sense that they perceive these bodies as being on an equal footing with different 
roles to play. They also believe that if the civil service expends too many resources attending to the 
Storting and its control function, then ordinary tasks and functions will suffer as a result. In other 
words, they generally see control as a distraction from the matter at hand and they are critical of both 
the extent of control and the instruments used. An additional, cultural aspect is that they are reluctant 
to abandon the long and well established tradition of control by the Storting that is passive and 
general and gives the civil service much leeway. 
Our main interpretation is that the effects of increased parliamentarian control of the executive cannot 
be characterized simply as a reflection of oversight. Nor are they purely the product of competition or 
of mutuality. Rather, the dynamics of the control process are a complicated mix of hierarchical 
components, interest representation and bargaining, political-administrative culture and tradition, and 
also elements of randomness. One example of this mixture or hybrid control forms is performance 
auditing. While this practice to some extent reflects oversight and the hierarchical superior-
subordinate relationship between the legislature and the executive, it also includes elements of 
negotiation and consultation – between the audit office and the audited agencies and between the 
parties in government and opposition – and bears the legacy of the Norwegian style of governance, 
characterized by mutual cooperation and a high level of trust. Adding to this there is an element of 
randomness in performance auditing in selection of cases for this kind of auditing. Another example is 
the introduction of the spontaneous or oral question time, which is a combination of retrieved 
randomness and oversight. The same is to some extent the cas e with open hearings. 
What influence have structural devolution, MBOR and adaptation to the EU had on the effects of 
increased control by the legislature over the executive? Structural devolution of commercial activities 
undermines political control of state companies, and to some extent administrative control as well. 
Given the unchanged principle of ministerial responsibility, political executive leaders are now 
experiencing more difficulty in fulfilling their obligations towards the Storting, meaning that they will 
probably more often than before have to take responsibility for issues they have little control over. 
The gap between formal responsibility and real influence will increase (Brunsson 1989). MBOR has 
more potential for control by the political leadership in the executive but will often give administrative 
leaders more influence, which may also undermine their authority vis-à-vis a more active parliament. 
Thus, these two reform features are likely to make the ministers feel hemmed in between increased 
parliamentary control, on the one hand, and the increased autonomy of administrative leaders of 
independent agencies and state companies on the other. Adaptation to the EU and the EEA makes 
the situation even more complicated, because the influence of the executive is increasing relative to 
the Storting, and the influence of bureaucrats is increasing relative to the Cabinet, thus undermining 
both the control potential of the parliament over the executive and the ministers over the bureaucracy. 
At the same time, the super-national features of the EU will also limit the role of the executive.  
Our argument is that it is important to recognize that the organizational structure is often such that 
managers accountable to the government and ministers accountable to the legislature cannot answer 
directly for the actions and performance of service providers and regulators. The role of political 
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leaders is ambiguous under NPM. Elected officials have a role as strategists in defining long-term 
goals and assessing the results, but at the same time they are expected to give considerable discretion 
to operative agencies. This represents a great challenge for the control function. The emergence of 
NPM and Europeanization thus seems to have made control and accountability more ambiguous and 
complex. There is an in-built inconsistency in the claim that managers can be freed and political 
control strengthened simultaneously.   
Control  of  Universit ies and higher education 2 
The core idea of New Public Management (NPM) as the ideology manifested itself in the area of 
higher education is the notion that a university ought to be organized and governed like a corporate 
enterprise. The ideology has not only been expressed in terms of the new tools of governance and 
control such as management by objectives, activity planning and performance control. It is also 
expressed in a series of other reforms that have been implemented within the Norwegian civil service 
the last decade. First we shall present some characteristics of traditional regulation of the university 
sector. Then we shall sketch the ideas behind the reforms as they apply to the university sector in 
Norway.  
In the following three sections we shall analyse the introduction of a number of measures that 
constituted central elements of the NPM policies in the Norwegian university sector. First, after a 
brief overview of the Norwegian higher education system, we focus on the internal reorganization 
process that led to a series of mergers of departments into bigger and presumably more efficient units. 
Secondly we analyse measure was the introduction of activity planning and evaluation. In the third 
section we shall take a closer look at the third and perhaps most elusive reform element, the 
decentralization and strengthening of leadership at all levels of the university organization. Finally we 
conclude by giving a brief assessment of the extent to which and how the introduction of the 
measures described above has led to fundamental changes in the regulation of higher education. 
H i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  
Norwegian higher education is made up mainly by three major categories of institutions: research 
universities, university colleges and state colleges with a total of almost 200.000 students in 2001. The 
first university (Oslo) was established  in 1811, followed by the universities of Bergen (1948), 
Trondheim (1969) and Tromsø (1972). In 1960 there were 9.600 university students and the number 
has since been rising constantly with particularly rapid growth periods from the late 1960s to the early 
1970s and from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s and the student population had reached about 74.000 
in 2001. The eight university colleges are specialized institutions in economics and business 
administration, agriculture, veterinary medicine, architecture, physical education and sport, theology 
and music. Their student population in 2001 was close to 7.800. The 26 state colleges, some of which 
have campuses in different locations, straddle a system that until 1995 comprised more than 200 
institutions. They provide a great variety of educational tracks among which vocational training of 
teachers, social workers, nurses and engineers are among the most important ones in numerical terms. 
The state colleges had a total of slightly more than 91.000 students in 2001. In addition there are a 
number of other colleges that has a total of about 25.000 students. The higher education system is 
predominantly public, and only some 25.000 students find themselves in private institutions. 
                                                                 
2 This section is based on Bleiklie et al. (2000). 
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Until 1976 universities and university colleges made up the Norwegian higher education system, and 
there were separate individual laws for some of the institutions. The University and College Act of 
1989 brought universities and university colleges under a common legal framework. The Higher 
Education Act of 1995 went one step further and unites today all higher education institutions within 
a common higher education system. The upgrading of previous vocational schools to higher 
education institutions has, therefore, caused a substantial part of the rapid growth of higher education 
during the 1990s. 
N a t u r e  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  
The regulation of the Norwegian university sector has traditionally been based on two different and 
potentially conflicting university functions. The first is related to the university as part of the national 
civil service and as implementer of public policy. As such the university is in principle a public agency 
and finds itself within a hierarchical bureaucratic order where it puts knowledge at the disposal of 
superior political administrative units. In this capacity loyalty is the central expectation directed towards 
a university, the primary task of which is to implement state policies. The most important 
responsibility of the universities in relation to the state has traditionally been the education of properly 
prepared candidates for top positions in the civil service and the learned professions.3 This university 
function is primarily regulated by oversight. The importance of the universities as public agencies is 
evident in the Scandinavian university systems based as they are on the traditional German university 
ideal. The character of Norwegian universities as degree providing institutions, where the emphasis is 
put on the certification rather than the teaching of students, is one manifestation of this heritage. 4 
Today the public agency expectation has been reinforced by the integration of the universities in a 
unified national activity planning system and in a national legislation for higher education institutions. 
However, political authorities have traditionally been reluctant to manage the universities in ways that 
might be portrayed as attacks against the freedom of teaching and research. This would run against the 
deeply entrenched second function of the universities as cultural institutions, the primary task of which is 
to engage in academic activity, based on autonomous research and teaching. The modern notion of 
the university as a cultural institution is historically rooted in the Humboldtian university ideal. Within 
the Humboldtian university the internal organizational structure was based on autonomous chairs with 
affiliated apprentice students (Neave and Rhoades 1987: 283ff). The most important expectation of 
the university as a collegium of chair holders was academic excellence, in the sense that each one of the 
chair holders asserts their scholarly authority through outstanding research, by attracting talented 
students and by creating good research environments. The authority thus rested primarily with «the 
visible and horizontal collegium» of chair holders emphasizing mutuality as the legitimate form of 
regulation.  
As the Norwegian universities, as well as their English, French, West German and Scandinavian 
counterparts, were democratized during the 1970s a small elite of full professors was replaced by 
representative bodies comprising all the different functional groups of the organization, but were still 
dominated by tenured academic staff. Nevertheless, the role of public authorities is still to secu re the 
freedom of research and teaching by legal and financial means and mutuality is still emphasized as an 
important form of regulation. The relationship between oversight and mutuality has traditionally been 
struck in the following way: Certain decisions, e.g. on hiring of professors, the establishment of 
                                                                 
3  Ben-David and Zloczower (1991) argue that according to the Humboldtian «idea of a university», this aspect was decisive for 
the «contract» which regulated the relationship between the university and the Prussian state. Its core idea was that the 
universities were given the right to organize their education and conduct research and scholarly activities as they pleased 
provided they saw to it that the state's needs for qualified bureaucrats and academic professionals were satisfied. 
4 According to Øverland (1988) this characteristic is clearly different from the teaching oriented American universities, which in 
comparison emphasize the teaching process heavily, and the certification process relatively lightly. 
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academic degree studies, the sanctioning of curricula rested formally with the Ministry, but were in 
reality made by the disciplinary communities within the universities. Another set of decisions, in 
particular budget decisions, were often very detailed, specifying such things as individual new 
professorships and the distribution of funds between different functions in a rigid manner. The size of 
the budgets was estimated on the basis of existing needs in terms of number of staff, students and 
infrastructure. In budget matters oversight was tight and rigid, but the content of academic activity 
itself was almost entirely left to the institutions (teaching) or the individual academic (research). In 
sum, oversight was tight, focusing on process rather then outcome and confined to a limited set of 
activities, whereas mutuality was formally circumscribed, but in practice a dominant form of 
regulation. Competition was used mainly in connection with the announcement of academic positions. 
C h a n g e s  a n d  n e w  f o r m s  o f  c o n t r o l  
The changing ideas of what a university ideally should be can be understood in terms of the notion of 
the university is to be a corporate enterprise the primary responsibility of which is the efficient production 
of research and candidates (Bleiklie 1998, Keller 1983, Olsen and Peters 1996, Pollit 1990). The 
ideology behind the university reforms introduced after the Hernes Commission Report (NOU 
1988:28) from the late 1980s on emphasizes the importance of higher education for national 
economic growth. This implied an emphasis on quality as a fundamental objective of the university, an 
idea that apparently is well attuned to more traditional notions about the cultural mission of the 
modern university. However, the emphasis on efficiency in student output is clearly dominant if one 
looks at the operational measures that were put in place. This emphasis was recently strengthened 
further by the latest reform officially named «The quality reform» in higher education that was 
introduced in 2002 and is scheduled to be fully implemented by mid-2003. Together with the idea that 
increased efficiency can be achieved by means of performance indicators, these notions tend to imply 
that the administrative element in university governance should be strengthened in order to ensure a 
standardized and controllable handling of the growing burden of teaching and research. As we shall 
return to in the discussion, «The quality reform» signals drastic changes that may entail a sharp and 
radical break with Norwegian higher education reform traditions. 
The expectation of increased efficiency implies that the tasks of formulating production goals, 
mobilizing resources and support by means of incentive systems become crucial concerns. This 
implied a move from the traditional ex ante regulation to ex post  control where the focus is on 
performance in relation to formulated policy goals, first and foremost of output of student exams and 
candidates and a new funding model more based on these kinds of output. When the emphasis was 
moved from rule production and rule adherence to goal formulation and performance control 
evaluation became a core activity and thus changed the way in which the state went about its business 
of governance in the university sector. But it also meant a drive for reorganizing the university in 
order to make it into an organization with characteristics of a corporate enterprise implying increased 
competition on resources and students. Economy of scale and leadership are concepts that became 
important in this connection, in addition to evaluation and performance control. In the rest of this 
part we shall focus on these three topics. 
Merging Departments. One of the measures that were introduced during the late 1980s and early 
1990s was the merger of smaller university departments into bigger ones. A government white paper 
on research policy from 1981 pointed at problems associated with small departments (St.meld.nr.69, 
1981–82, p.7). As was the case in many western countries, the idea of economy of scale in academic 
management gained hold during the late 1980s (Goedegebuure 1992; Skodvin 1999). In Norway this 
belief was clearly expressed both by the Hernes Commission and by those who introduced NPM 
reforms. The general idea was that a department ought to have an academic staff of at least 15–20 
persons in order to be administratively efficient. The introduction of activity planning was also based 
on the presumption that the administrative capacity of each individual department should be 
increased. The administrative argument was thus at the heart of the matter. In the years after the 
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Hernes Report this policy lead to a number of mergers in the university sector. At the University of 
Bergen the number of departments at the Science Faculty was reduced from 18 to 14 departments and 
at the Psychological Faculty from eleven to five departments. At the Medical Faculty of the University 
of Oslo 110 departments were merged into six ‘departmental groups’ in which the former 
departments have the status of sections (Kyvik and Marheim Larsen 1993). The disciplinary field least 
affected by mergers was the social sciences whereas the most conflict-ridden mergers took place 
within the humanities, particularly at the University of Oslo. In the following we shall focus on the 
merger processes within the humanities in order to see what sort of tensions that were present 
between traditional and new ideas about the organization of academic activity.  
Many of the arguments that were used by the involved parties in the debates on mergers in Oslo and 
Bergen are similar. The arguments in favor of mergers were based on the way in which changing 
external conditions affected the humanities. Most important among these were its relations to other 
academic fields, the need to gain political confidence by supporting public policies and to improve the 
general image of the humanities in the face of a general lack of legitimacy. The fierce opposition to 
changes was in turn based on the support of well-established stable historical patterns and a 
pronounced skepticism against the economy of scale argument. The departmental structure was partly 
a remnant of the chair-faculty system. It is however also important to keep in mind that university 
departments usually formed the resource-base within the institution for the various disciplinary groups 
and was the basis for representation on the Faculty Board that makes funding decisions. Changes in 
the basic principle of this structure, the identity of disciplinary and departmental divisions, might 
change the whole structure of alliances of academic politics through which disciplinary groups watch 
and control one another. Because of their almost total dependence on internal university funding the 
humanities were more vulnerable to such changes than other disciplinary areas with more ample 
external funding. This observation may explain some of the differences between humanities faculties 
and other faculties’ reactions to mergers. 
In contrast to the college sector were the mergers were imposed from above by the government, the 
mergers in the university sector were actively promoted by institutional leaders among whom the idea 
of economy of scale apparently has gained wide acceptance (Vabø 2002). The main concern of the 
opposition to department mergers was to secure the future position of their disciplines at the 
university by preserving some sort of status quo. They considered mergers to be a threat against the 
established system of relations between the various disciplinary groups and between the disciplines 
and the faculty leadership. The disciplinary groups considered it of vital importance to have a 
department of their own, not only because it guaranteed 'slice of the resource-pie’, but also because it 
entailed a certain security for their future existence. Changes in department structure were therefore, 
considered a threat against the very existence of the discipline. Those who were in favor of mergers 
were concerned about the relations between the humanities and the public at large. They regarded 
political ‘capital’ in the form of goodwill and support as vital to the future existence of the humanities. 
The main outcome of the merger processes was to separate disciplinary allegiances from 
administrative structures. Disciplinary groups and administrative units are not necessarily identical any 
more. This is an outcome that may weaken the ability of certain disciplinary groups to fight effectively 
for their own interests in the internal struggle for resources. The split between administration and 
discipline may thus weaken the position of particular local disciplinary perspectives and pave the way 
for a departmental administration that may become more independent of specific disciplines and their 
particular needs. This development facilitates the comparison of disciplines according to standardized 
criteria of efficiency and quality. This latter point is even more relevant in connection with the 
development of new planning and evaluation procedures. Thus it was no coincidence that the conflict 
about mergers at the Faculty of Humanities in Oslo spilled over into the conflicts about activity 
planning. The process also turned the issue of internal reorganization, which traditionally has been 
regarded as an internal matter, into process where the central authorities formulate the goals (bigger 
departments) and the institutions are given responsibility and freedom to implement them as they see 
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fit, but with the implicit assumption that their ability to comply may be of importance to future 
evaluation and funding. 
Activity Planning and Performance Control. A mobilization and resistance from academics that 
increased as the implementation date drew nearer met the implementation of activity planning, and it 
culminated in a heated debate about activity planning in 1989–90. The criticism against activity 
planning was mainly raised by academics at the University of Oslo. This controversy turned out to 
involve the most important principal discussion of the last decades about academic freedom. 
According to the opponents activity planning and the principles on which it was based threatened the 
academic freedom. 
The controversy focused on the ideal of management by objectives. The concept of ‘goal’ for a 
university was itself questioned in the controversy at the University of Oslo. Should a university 
formulate goals? To what extent is it possible or advisable for an organization the purpose of which is 
to discover the unknown, to settle for a specific goal that necessarily cannot include what is unknown? 
How is it possible to plan for a pursuit that is without direction (Vabø 2002)? Less principled 
discussions concerned the ideal content of the goals of a university or a university department and the 
question of who is qualified to evaluate the degree of goal achievement (Christensen 1991). 
Some of the goals of a university may under certain conditions be in clear conflict. Although research 
and teaching both are vital goals, increasing the effort in one area may decrease the effort in the other. 
However, the planning regime imposed on the universities was quite mild. The goals and their 
operational criteria were not imposed on academics from above. The actors themselves were at each 
level to formulate general as well as operational goals. Therefore it is easy for each unit to formulate 
goals and commit themselves to whatever goals would help them look good in they eyes of their 
superiors. Thus it was argued that activity planning would easily become a costly annual ritual with no 
other purpose than pleasing university administrators and ministry bureaucrats. What the opponents 
considered attempts by the government to control Academia, as if they were technical instruments 
that might be used for whatever utilitarian purpose politicians fancied, added to the intensity of the 
controversy. The conflict followed already latent conflict patterns – generated by the established 
controversy about the question of positivism. The then Minister of Education – Gudmund Hernes – 
is by profession a mathematical sociologist and represented thus the ominous combination of both 
positivism and dirigisme in the eyes of the opposition. Another element that contributed to raising the 
temperature of the Oslo controversy was the entrenched notion about the University of Oslo as the 
academic center of nation. If the government could force the University of Oslo to comply with its 
instructions about introducing activity planning, this would affect the entire learned culture of the 
nation (Vabø 2002). 
It was also argued against too strong reliance upon performance indicators because they measured 
only the level of activity and consequently gave an inadequate and limited picture of academic work. 
The indicators did not give any information about the quality of the content of research or teaching. Peer 
reviews were in this connection pointed out as the only acceptable method for quality assessment. The 
purpose of the reviews should not be administrative control, but to set off a learning process for those 
involved. Peer reviews would also help making the qualities and needs of the various disciplines 
visible.  
These arguments represented a similar concern that was evident in the controversy about activity 
planning. It raised several questions about activity planning such as: what is 'management by results' 
actually supposed to mean? Would this entail some kind of 'bureaucratization' of academic relations? 
While the academic groups themselves formulate both general and operational goals in the activity 
planning process, performance indicators represent a class of operational goals that are explicitly 
formulated outside the institutions that are affected. This latter point became evident when a 
proportion of university budgets were linked to performance indicators. These funds were distributed 
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according to achieved scores on indicators representing government targets for teaching and research 
productivity.5  
Due to the elements of autonomy that was built into the implementation process and the widespread 
use of peer reviews for evaluation purposes, the introduction of activity planning has not yet had the 
drastic consequences that some its opponents feared. Our data on higher education reform lends 
stronger support to the objection against activity planning as a time consuming ritual rather than as a 
control instrument that threatens academic freedom. On the other hand, the use of performance 
indicators makes activities like research and teaching that previously were inaccessible to outsiders, 
more transparent and open for evaluation and control by outsiders. Therefore they have a potential as 
instruments that may be used to impose control or justify cuts in funding, as have been the case in 
other countries where similar NPM policy instruments have been introduced. Likewise peer-reviews 
may be used as an academic justification for administratively defined positive or negative sanctions. 
This is clearly the case with the 'selectivity exercises' in Britain where peer-reviews are used to give 
grades to departments influencing research grant allocations. Yet, peer-reviews may also end up as 
fairly empty rituals if they become guided by a collegial solidarity where fellow academics give their 
colleagues the evaluation they ask for. 
Delegation and Strengthening of Leadership. Decentralization of administrative authority was an 
important element in the Civil Service Reform Program in general and for the higher education 
reforms in particular. The university legislation of 1989 comprised measures that aimed both at 
insuring governmental control and delegation of powers. One of the most important principal 
changes that were introduced by the new legislation was that deans were barred from membership on 
the university board, and that members of the board could not participate in other representative 
bodies. This represented a radical break with a representative system that relatively systematically had 
been based on disciplinary representation and overlapping memberships in the sense that department 
chairs automatically were represented on the faculty boards and the deans on the university boards. 
Towards the late 1980s as ever more groups, subordinate university teachers, fellows, students and 
administrative staff had gained representative rights, bodies like the faculty boards and the university 
boards had become quite large (up till 50 members) and were often accused of inefficiency and poor 
leadership. The characteristics that remained constant were the solid majority of academic staff and 
the overlapping representation of bodies at different levels. The Ministry wanted to reduce the size of 
the representative bodies radically to a standard size of 9 members that was modified by legislators to 
between 9 and 13 members. The intention was to strengthen the board and enable it to act more 
efficiently and responsibly as a representative body for the entire institution rather than as a collection 
of the special interests of the disciplines. By keeping the numbers low and the deans out, the idea was 
that the boards would be less ridden by partisan infighting. The new bill also proposed a larger 
university council that only had a consultative status, but in which the deans could be represented. 
The deans were not particularly happy about this situation, but their grievances were to some extent 
redressed through informal meetings with the board. Thus the need for mutual information and 
contact circumvented the formal prohibition that bars the same person from participating in the in 
decisions on the same matter at two different organizational levels. The council itself, however, 
remains a body devoid of power and apparently of little consequence (Høstaker, 1997). It is difficult 
to ascertain whether the level of partisan struggles actually has been reduced, but the partisan interest 
of tenured teachers as a corporate group is assured as they still make up a majority in representative 
bodies at all levels. The Storting carried the university bill in 1989. In 1995 a new higher education bill 
                                                                 
5  Among the indicators were the number of publications, number of degree candidates and number of doctors. The production of 
higher degree candidates was emphasized particularly in connection with the performance-based part of the funding, and the 
compensation for doctoral degrees was better than for master level degrees. In the former case female candidates counted more 
than male candidates. 
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was introduced that modified and extended the principles of the 1989 legislation to the entire higher 
education system.  
One of the important tasks that were delegated from the central government to the university boards 
was the appointment of professors. This delegation of authority meant that new professors would no 
longer be conferred the status and privileges of top civil servants (embetsmenn) since the Government 
has the exclusive privilege of appointing top civil servants. The law furthermore delegated the task of 
appointing the middle tier of teaching positions from the university board to the faculty boards. 
Finally the universities were granted more autonomy in economic and real estate matters. The means 
by which the Ministry exercised its formal control over the universities were by demanding an annual 
report providing information on performance on a number of indicators, and retain its traditional 
privilege to have the final say concerning the establishment of faculties, degrees and study tracks.  
The higher education reform dealt with leadership issues in a way that was similar to the Civil service 
reform program. The higher education reform proposals of 1988 emphasized that there ought to be a 
clearer distinction between administrative and academic issues. The type of representative rule that 
developed in the 1970s and 1980s was considered too time-consuming, involving too many people in 
decision-making on too many issues. They proposed therefore to strengthen the administration and 
delegate decisions on ‘trivial’ and ‘non-academic’ matters to it. Faculty councils and university boards 
ought to deal less with detail and more with strategic issues. This meant more delegation of authority 
in matters of local interest to the departments concerned. Finally the higher education reform 
proposed to strengthen academic leadership at all levels within the universities. 
Stronger leadership at the department level was regarded as a logical consequence of the increased 
administrative workloads that came with activity planning, annual reporting and the delegation of tasks 
and authority to the departments. The discussion on governance in particular focused on the position 
of the department chair. After the transition to representative rule in the 1970s the department council 
elected the chair for a two-year term. Only tenured staff members were eligible for a chair position. 
Always an office with arduous administrative tasks, the position evolved into an unwanted obligation 
most tenured teachers had to endure sooner or later when their turn was up. The vast majority of the 
tenured teachers thus became chairs at some point in their career. Even among the tenured mid-tier 
academic staff a majority seems to have held this office.  
One reason why leadership positions are regarded mainly as an administrative obligation is the 
leadership ideal that became deeply entrenched in Norwegian universities during the democratization 
process of the 1970s. Leadership has since tended to be defined only vaguely and negatively. The ideal 
envisions the leader as a collegial coordinator who claims authority in his or her capacity as a member of 
an egalitarian and autonomous disciplinary community. The collegial leader (be it a department chair, a 
dean or a rector) is an elected representative of a discipline or a group of disciplines who is expected 
to co-ordinate the activities of the disciplinary community internally and to fight for its interests 
externally. As a colleague and a coordinator he or she is expected to be an accomplished interest 
representative and politician  rather than a disciplinary entrepreneur. The leader is correspondingly, met 
with few expectations apart from keeping a minimum of order in his own house, acquiring as many 
resources as possible for the common household, and not meddling in the affairs of his disciplinary 
peers without being invited to do so (Bleiklie 1997). A department is therefore often seen as a place 
that is notoriously difficult to lead, and where negotiations on important academic matters tend to be 
slow and time consuming. The overall picture underscores the weak position of the Norwegian 
department chair. The chair is typically a person who is mainly busy performing administrative duties 
and keeps a low profile in matters that may generate internal controversy.  
It has been a political aim for the universities throughout the 1990s to strengthen the authority of the 
department Chair. The head should not only be an academic leader, but also a business manager with 
a more active and strategically oriented profile. There are conflicting views among professors and 
chairs on the desirability as well the realism of this attempted role definition. University leaders also 
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indicate that they feel the attempts to strengthen the role of department chairs within the present 
election system have not been very successful, and that the role of department chair has not changed 
substantially in practice. The overall impression is that until now the changes have primarily taken 
place at the ideological level. This does not mean however, that department governance and leadership 
have not changed. In faculties where mergers have taken place, an elected chair from one of the 
disciplines does break with former principles of disciplinary autonomy, as it has been traditionally 
understood in Norwegian universities. In addition, most departments today have normally been 
furnished with a chief officer who is supposed to take care of administrative leadership functions. 
Furthermore, both at university level and faculty level, attempts are made at strategic policy 
formulation. This means that the need to bolster the leadership function may be supported by a 
number of developments in addition to the direct attempts at strengthening the role of department 
chairs.  
D i s c u s s i o n  
Compared to the lofty ambitions in the late 1980s it may seem striking how little has been achieved in 
terms of managerialist policies as they initially were presented by the government. Activity planning 
and stronger leadership have so far not had very tangible effects on practices at the departmental level. 
This strengthens the impression of the remarkable stability that in comparative terms has 
characterized the Norwegian state-university relationship in modern history. Nevertheless some 
changes during the 1990s regarding managerialism can be observed. There have been clear tendencies 
in the direction of standardization and formalization of planning and budgeting. Management by 
objectives and result does, furthermore, have the potential of becoming a rigid form of regulation by 
oversight, particularly in connection with budget cuts. Each year the universities report their results 
measured in terms of performance indicators. These indicators have achieved the de facto status as the 
only common operational goals of the university. Finally the attitudes of the parties involved have 
become more pragmatic, and the professors involved in university decision making seem to have 
realized that the managerialist planning and evaluation tools are just as susceptible to politics and 
contextual factors as previous arrangements. 
As an overall assessment, the ch anges we have observed in the university sector do not primarily 
represent a change in the type and composition of controls. The important changes are rather evident 
in the way in which the existing control types are used. In terms of regulation more detailed oversight 
over a limited area has been replaced by less detailed oversight over a wider array of issues. 
Furthermore the focus of regulation by oversight has shifted from process (rule following) to outcome 
(goal attainment). Mutuality has been weakened in the area of university governance but has been 
strengthened through the spread of peer review evaluation of disciplinary and institutional 
performance. Competition for academic positions and research funds has been a longstanding form of 
control. With an increasing share of total university budgets funded by competitive research grants, 
competition has become more important. Institutional competition for students has also increased 
since the early 1980s. This has been triggered by two factors: the reduced student supply and the 
introduction of funding mechanisms that reward institutions for attracting students and efficiently 
producing successful candidates. Contrived randomness has no visible role in the regulation of the 
Norwegian university sector.  
As indicated above, «The quality reform» may signal a period of more drastic changes of the higher 
education system. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, a new degree structure based on the 1999 
European Bologna declaration, will introduce Bachelor, Masters and PhD degrees and a course credit 
system across the entire higher education sector. For most academic disciplines this entails profound 
structural changes in the organization of educational programs and exam systems. The speed and 
intensity with which the new degree system is implemented means that this part of the reform will be 
completed in the course of one year by the fall of 2003. The second reason is that the reform 
presupposes an increased teaching effort that is not matched by increasing funds. At least partially this 
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effort has to be funded by reallocation of resources within the system. In addition, a funding system is 
scheduled to be introduced in 2003 that puts a premium on teaching efficiency. One way in which this 
may be achieved is by hiring more teaching personnel on short-term contracts. If this happens the 
traditionally homogenous corps of academic personnel in the Norwegian university sector will 
become more differentiated. Thirdly there seems to be an increased willingness to accept diversity in 
the organization and leadership of higher education. The institutions have now more external 
representatives on their boards from January 1, 2003. After the government opened up for changes in 
organization and leadership structures it is up to the individual institution to decide whether they want 
to change the existing dual leadership at department and faculty level or replace it with a single 
appointed leader. This means that some institutions have started to introduce leadership reforms that 
were not possible previously when reform oriented institutions were bound by standard arrangements 
based on system wide compromises. The government has indicated that appointed leaders might 
replace the dual system entirely in the future. These developments are likely to strengthen the trend 
observed above in a much more forceful way than previously so that the manner in which existing 
control instruments are used might changed more radically in the same direction. Although the system 
seems poised for a period of radical change, it is important to remember that we need to see how the 
reform is implemented before we make any definite judgment. 
Control  of  prisons6 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  N o r w e g i a n  p r i s o n  s y s t e m 7 
The first modern prison in Norway came into use in 1851. The thought behind this «new» prison was 
that isolation in cells would benefit the prison’s goals, because of the fact that the prisoners would not 
be able to influence each other in a negative sense. During the next decade, 56 local «cell-prisons» 
were built. The prison law of 1903 introduced a prison system characterised by a «class strategy», in 
which the prisoners could move up in the prison structure and receive more privileges or goods when 
behaving properly. Also the practice of allowing inmates a trial release originates from this period. The 
«cell system», although introduced for its expected benefits and positive influence on prisoners, was 
slowly abandoned, as the negative effects of isolation became obvious, and also because it hindered 
work operations. However, a high degree of isolation was common until the 1940s.  
The new prison law of 1958 clearly stated the negative effects of isolation. From this moment, the 
inmates would be allowed a high degree of fellowship during the day, but of course they would still be 
locked up at night. Another characteristic of the new law was «treatment optimism», i.e. believing that 
it is possible to reform an inmate to a well-functioning, law-abiding citizen. For this reason, it would 
be necessary to adjust the prison operations so that they as much as possible resembled «real life». 
Therefore, the inmates should be given meaningful employment, such as work or schooling, and 
meaningful leisure activities. The most recent prison law, approved in 2000, includes for the first time 
the Norwegian probation service, the system that from 1841 has taken care of ex-inmates after their 
release. The probation service also has the responsibility for the administration of community work, 
which has been approved as an alternative correction method since 1984. 
Organisation and reorganisation of the prison system. The Ministry of Justice has the overall 
responsibility for the prison system in Norway. The central management is organised both as a 
division within the ministry and as an independent agency/directorate, named The prison and 
                                                                 
6  The data used in this paper are public documents, such as reports by Statskonsult, and interviews with respondents from 
different areas in the prison system. In order to maintain the respondents’ anonymity, information and quotes from the 
interviews have been used without referring to the exact source. 
7   This part is based on Statskonsult’s report 2001:11.  
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probation department. In earlier years, this kind of «mixed directorate» was a relatively common 
organisational structure in Norwegian central government, but during the last 40 years most such 
directorates in other departmental areas have been unwound. The reason for this has been that such 
organisational forms often result in unclear steering relationships between and within governmental 
units. During the last 10–15 years, the Ministry of Justice has looked into this argument, but for the 
time being, the prison system continues to be organised as a mixed directorate.  
Until 2001, when the prison system was reorganised, the organisational structure consisted of a central 
management at the Ministry of Justice, and a sub-central level, consisting of the managers of the 5 
largest prisons and the leaders of the 4 regions, which included 39 prisons of different types. 
Independent decision-making authority was usually limited to these levels, but could be delegated 
further down the organisational structure. The loyalty between the prisons and the ministry was 
generally low. At the sub-central level, there were no organisational links between the prisons and the 
probation service. There was a generally weak common culture within the prison service and especially 
between the prison service and the probation service.  
 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
UNTIL 2000 
 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
FROM 2001 
Central level: Prison and probation 
department in The Ministry of Justice 
Central level: Prison and probation department in the 
Ministry of Justice 
    
Regional level: 6 region managers   
 
4 areas 
managing 
39 prisons 
5 large prisons Prisons in the region Probation service divisions in the region 
 
 
Figure 1: Organisational structure of the Norwegian prison system before and after January 1, 2001 
 
From 2001, 6 regions were established, which contain all prisons and divisions of the probation 
services within their borders. Unlike the 4 areas in the old structure, the 6 new regions follow the 
province borders.8 Every region has its own manager and a staff of 15–22 employees, depending on 
the region’s size. In this way a third regional level has been introduced in the prison system’s 
organisational structure.  
                                                                 
8 For this reason, some prisons were moved from one region to another after the reorganisation. In these cases, prison 
management was confronted with even more changes.  
9 The numbers are similar to those of Sweden and Denmark. The rest of Europe has a rate of 100 per 100 000 in prison, and in 
the USA the rate is 680 (Nishio 2002). 
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The main reason for this reorganisation of the Norwegian prison system has been to improve the 
Ministry of Justice’s steering and managing functions. Instead of having to confer with 9 local 
managers and 21 managers of probation service divisions, the prison and probation department is now 
able to communicate directly with the 6 region managers. The new organisational structure should also 
contribute to more delegation to the regional level and to a more flexible use of means and staff 
because of the joint regional management for prisons and the probation service divisions. 
Total prison capacity is about 3000 inmates and each inmate has his own cell. The largest prison has a 
capacity of 350. All together a total of 62 persons for each 100 000 Norwegians citizens were in prison 
in 2001.9 It is about 2500 full time positions in the Norwegian prison service.  
Management and decision-making. Until the recent reorganisation, the professional and 
administrative management were separated. The directorial part of the prison and probation 
department has been responsible for the professional management of the prison system, such as 
dealing with cases concerning individual inmates. Another task was to formulate, within the legal 
framework, regulations and guidelines regarding the treatment of inmates. The departmental part has 
been responsible for the administrative management, such as personnel management and the 
processing of complaints from or on behalf of inmates.  
The new organisational structure has resulted in a new division of tasks within the prison and 
probation department. The separation of professional and administrative responsibilities is no longer 
desired. The department’s main responsibilities are formulating prison policy, preparing legislation and 
laying down the annual budget. The directorate now has responsibility for the execution of policy, 
personnel and administrative management, and individual cases regarding inmates, except for mercy 
cases.  
There is ample possibility for delegation of the executive power from the central level to the various 
prison governors. The main rule is that the prison governor takes all prison-related decisions, of course 
within the legal framework, unless another decision-making authority is specified. Furthermore, the 
prison governor can delegate responsibilities down the prison hierarchy. However, only the prison 
governor can make decisions about inmate penalties or granting permission.  
D i f f e r e n t  f o r m s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  c o n t r o l 10 
The four types of control are of different importance in the management of the Norwegian prison 
system. The element of competition seems to be less used. The other three forms, on the other hand, 
have played or play an important role in the management of the prison system. In this paragraph, we 
will take a closer look at the different types of control and management. 
Competetion. The element of competition seems to be generally weak. Contraction out or 
privatisation of the prison service has not been an issue in Norway. Neither is there any significant 
competition between the prisons. Traditionally the individual prison has little influence on the budget 
allocations. There is, however, a strong union within the Norwegian prison service. More than 90 per 
cent of the employees in the Norwegian Prison Service are union members. The dominant union is the 
Norwegian Prison and Probation Union, which organize 75 per cent of the prison officers. This is an 
active and high profile union working for the best possible professional, social and economic 
conditions for the members and also taking active part in the public debate on this policy area and in 
the administrative reform processes. Thus it plays an active role in consultation and negotiation 
                                                                 
 
10  This part is mainly based on interviews with 5 administrative leaders at the local level (prisons), regional level and central level 
(Ministry of Justice) and one leader of a control board. 
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processes and this represent an element of rivalry and competition within the Norwegian Prison 
Service. There is also an element of competition in the recruitment of students to the prison school. 
The number of applicants is normally much higher than the number in each class. 
Oversight. Control over prisoners by oversight is obvious both within the prisons and in the 
probation system. This is, however, not the main focus in this paper, which concentrates more on 
control over the prisons. The introduction of a regional level has resulted in a more distinct division of 
tasks between the Ministry of Justice and the regional and local authorities. The prison and probation 
departments responsibilities are now limited to policy, politics and legislation, whereas the 6 newly 
established regions are responsible for the management of the prisons and county jails. Although the 
introduction of the regional level may have resulted in a more clear division of tasks,  
«which makes life easier in many ways, the problem is that you lose the homogeneity in the 
execution of punishment, which means that the 6 regional managers must make a conscious 
effort to make the practice in the various prisons as co-ordinated and as comparable as 
possible.» 
However, the respondents also reveal that to maintain an absolute homogeneity in the different prisons 
and county jails is neither possible nor desirable. The different correctional facilities should not be as 
similar as possible, according to the managers. They report that it is important to make the most of the 
various resources and talents that exist in the different institutions, while harmonising these with the 
prison system’s goals and expectations. This means that an inmate in one prison can experience the 
daily prison life in a different way from an inmate in another prison. It will be obvious that this can be 
problematic.  
As for the reason why the daily life in one prison can differ from the daily life in another prison, 
Statskonsult’s report states that especially the management of the smaller institutions has experienced 
difficulties in following the developments in the late 1980s and 1990s. Their main concern was to 
administer as much peace as possible. To engage in processes of change, even though these were 
initiated by the parliament, would mean to cause commotion and unrest in the organisation. The 
governors of the smaller institutions did not consider this a desirable development and chose to ignore 
the Ministry of Justice’s instructions. This was possible, because the Ministry of Justice seemed to be 
more interested in policy-making and goal-defining than in controlling the execution of these policies 
and goals (Statskonsult, 2001:41). Different policies have been implemented to a far higher degree in 
some prisons than in others. One example is the personal contact officer policy, which enhance the 
part of the job of the prison officer as supporting and motivating prisoners to use their period of 
incarceration constructively. Each inmate is assigned to one officer who he/she can contact for all 
questions and inquiries. Another example is different «plans for the future» policies (programs) dealing 
with various problems the inmates may experience, such as alcohol, drugs, or controlling feelings of 
e.g. rage or frustration. Statskonsult concludes that 
«this has resulted in substantial variations between the different correctional institutions, both 
with regard to which (…) policies they have implemented and with regard to how these 
policies have been implemented. There have been ample possibilities for the prison 
management to introduce local actions, and some prisons have through the years changed their 
(…) profile, because of creative prison managers taking initiative and using the opportunity 
that presented itself. Because of the fact that the central control of the implementation seems 
to have been relatively weak, the danger exists that some prisons have specialised themselves in 
a way that was not intended.» (Statskonsult, 2001:41–42) 
One of the reasons for reorganising the Norwegian prison system was the fact that the sector did not 
function in a coherent way (Statskonsult, 2001). The different prisons, in the hands of their governors 
and inspectors, acted largely in an individual way and according to local norms and rules. Even though 
the system today is more coherent than 10 years ago, it is still possible to prioritise local actions, 
instead of departmental policies. This becomes especially clear when we look at the different policies in 
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order to create a «fitted» prison stay for each inmates, by means of the contact-officer policy and the 
inmate programmes, as mentioned above. Even though the Ministry of Justice issued guidelines about 
the implementation of these policies, it was possible for prison governors to decide not to implement 
them, and continue in the same way as before. A former prison governor remembers the dilemmas 
related to this:  
«When they [Ministry of Justice] told us to implement the contact -officer policy, I thought it 
meant that we had to do that, and if we did not have the financial means, that we had to free 
financial means from other areas. And that took me a lot of time during the 1990s. And then I 
saw that there were many [other prison governors] who did nothing. They said they did not 
have the financial means. And of course, I could not say whether my colleagues’ financial 
situation was worse or just as bad as mine was. I could not be disloyal, and criticise the fact 
that they had newer cars than I had, but I did wonder.» 
Statskonsult concludes that the ministry has been less concerned with the control of results than with 
creating understanding for their goals. Feedback regarding implementation results has not been a part 
of the «control circle»; results have not been used in the steering of the various prisons, but have only 
been reported in the budget proposals. The existing differences between the institutions have been 
accepted and continued to exist. Pressure and incentives in order to achieve actual improvements have 
been absent. The responsibility for the implementation has been transferred to the prisons that often 
lack necessary resources to implement new policies. By transferring the responsibility for 
redistributing resources to the prisons the ministry also delegate the responsibility for making 
unpopular decisions. The department has been more concerned with «management by objectives» 
than with «management by (objectives and) results». Management by use of performance indicators 
and performance assessments has been difficult to execute.  
As a possible reason for this weak result management, Statskonsult reminds us of the mixed 
directorate and its double role. The ministerial responsibilities – policy advice and legislation – can be 
assumed to be prioritised at the expense of the directorial functions, such as executing and following 
up the contact -officer policy. Another reason may be the department’s possible over-emphasizing of 
one part of MBOR; the local level’s responsibility for the budget allocation in order to achieve a more 
efficient management. But the other part of MBOR consists of the department executing overall 
control over the results and the use of this knowledge in the continuation of the steering process. 
When we look at the Norwegian prison system, this type of result management has regularly been 
absent (Statskonsult, 2001). 
Contrived randomness. Besides the formal steering relationship between the departmental and 
regional level, and the various prisons and county jails, as discussed in the previous paragraph, the 
Ministry of Justice has other means to check what is going on in the institutions. The most important 
is the Control Board. Another important – although not under the control of the Ministry of Justice – 
are the media and civil society organisations. Because of the fact that both of these «controlling 
institutions» incorporate an element of randomness, they are examples of the second type of control 
and management to be discussed in this paragraph. 
Control Board11. The members of the Control Board represent various groups in society and are 
characterised by their concern for prison inmates. The leader of the Control Board has to be 
somebody with legal knowledge, such as a judge. The other members are laypersons. According to the 
law, there have to be at least 3 members, but usually a Control Board has more members. The Control 
Board visits the different divisions in a prison or county jail about once a month. These visits happen 
randomly. The prison management does not know that the Control Board is coming to visit, «until the 
                                                                 
11 This paragraph is largely based on an interview with a previous leader of the Control Board for a large prison in Norway. 
Therefore, information about this Control Board does not need to be representative for other Control Boards and other 
prisons. 
NO T A T  2 – 2003 CHANGING GOVERNMENT CONTROL  IN  NORWAY  
36  
moment when we ring the doorbell». The element of randomness is important to ensure that the 
members of the Control Board get a realistic view of the situation inside the prison. However, since 
the most important function of the Control Board is to be available for inmates who want to talk or 
file a complaint, this randomness can be said to cause logistical problems, especially in the larger, open 
prisons. Because of the fact that neither management nor inmates know when the Control Board will 
be visiting, it can happen that an inmate is not able to meet with a member of the Control Board. On 
the other hand, it is possible for inmates to contact the Control Board in order to make an 
appointment, so that a meeting between inmate and board member is ensured when the Control 
Board is visiting the prison the next time. One respondent, a former prison governor, reports another 
solution to this problem, namely that most visits of Control Board members were announced one day 
in advance. While reducing the logistical problems and increase the chance that every inmate gets a 
fair chance to meet with the Control Board, it will be clear that the element of contrived randomness 
is rapidly disappearing. 
When visiting the prison, the Control Board members are seated in a room, such as a library, and file 
the complaints that inmates have. A special form is filled out. Not all complaints are noted on these 
forms; when a Control Board member feels or knows that writing down the complaint will not result 
in any action from a higher level and/or improvement in the inmate’s situation anyway, the board 
member can decide – together with the inmate – not to file the complaint, and «just write down that 
we had a conversation about this-and-that». Sometimes the Control Board might not be the right 
institution to file the complaint. In these cases, the inmate gets help to file the complaint at the right 
place. Most complaints are about the food, the possibility to make phone calls, the right to be seen by 
a doctor, unfair treatment by a prison employee, and other «practical  things». Complaints of a far 
more serious character, such as abuse, are rare, simply because they almost never happen, according to 
the chairman of the board. On the other hand, one can wonder whether an inmate experiencing abuse 
from for example a prison employee will have the courage to file this complaint, because of fear for 
retaliation. In these cases, another inmate or prison guard may take responsibility and file a complaint, 
but one can never be completely sure that even the Control Board members get a complete and 
correct overview of everything that is happening inside the prison. This, however, seems to be an 
«unsolvable» problem. Yet, it is not likely that such problems exist to a high degree. One of the main 
functions of the Control Board is to «prevent a culture in which these things could happen, from 
establishing itself. The whole system is built on the assumption that somebody – anybody – would 
have let us know if there are serious problems with regard to an inmate. That is also the reason that 
we are there so often, once a month.» 
When a complaint is filed and registered, the form is sent to the prison management. As most 
complaints are about «practical, day-to-day» matters, the prison management can often deal with the 
complaint themselves. Their response is sent back to the Control Board and communicated to the 
inmate concerned. If the Control Board is not satisfied about the way in which the prison 
management has dealt with the complaint, they will formulate a response to the prison management’s 
response, which is sent back to the management. However, in most cases the members of the Control 
Board accept the way in which complaints are dealt with the prison management. Nevertheless, the 
responses from the prison management are thoroughly discussed on the Control Board meetings. It is 
not just a tradition to accept every excuse from the prison management. Financial limitations are often 
a reason for the prison management not being able to solve a problem or deal with a complaint. But 
even though the Control Board members can demand to be informed about the prison’s financial 
situation, this does not happen. «When financial arguments are used to show us why it is not possible 
for the prison management to adequately deal with a complaint, we base our opinion on the believe 
that this is true.»  
Media and civil society organisations. Both the media and national and international public organisations 
can execute random control over the prison system. The prison governor’s responsibility for handling 
media is complicated and he has to deal with questions such as «should we control interviews between 
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media and inmates?» and «should we have the right to decide which parts of interviews with inmates 
are published, or should they have total freedom of speech?» It will be obvious that the prison 
management can influence to a large degree which image media get from the prison system, by only 
showing them parts of the prison, or only giving them the opportunity to interview certain inmates, or 
no inmates at all. Although there are rules how to deal with the media, and which rights both inmates 
and journalists have, it is the prison governor who has the responsibility to interpret the rules. Besides 
the controlling function the media have on the inmates’ situation, another factor is the controlling 
risks that arise when many people from outside, enter the prison walls. Also this type of control is 
important – and often prioritised – when dealing with this type of questions.  
National and international public organisations, such as Amnesty International, The Red Cross, or 
various EU-organisations and – committees also have a function when looking at control and 
oversight of the Norwegian prison system. The European Torture Commission has been in Norway 
twice to check the inmates’ situation in the various prisons. Their criticisms and suggestions have been 
communicated to the Ministry of Justice, and have been largely followed up. These visits were 
unannounced, and therefore represented a possibility to get a realistic view inside the prisons and 
county jails. But again, the randomness of the commission could have caused problems. One prison 
governor remembers to have tried to find out when the commission would visit his prison, in order to 
prepare for their visit. However, this preparation did not have anything to do with improving the 
image of the prison the commission would get, but simply to make sure that the prison management 
was around and to be able to welcome the commission members.  
Mutuality. Another form of control within an institutional system, such as the Norwegian prison 
system, is mutuality; exposing individuals to peer-group pressures. While the function of the Control 
Board is partially based on this mechanism, in the sense that ideally a system exists in which any 
employee would have prevented systematic abuse of an inmate by a colleague, it will be clear that 
colleagues checking on each other, also can have another element, namely protection. The degree of 
job rotation is very low, and prison employees usually work in teams. This may result in a situation 
where, after a period of some years, these employees «become more close than a married couple. They 
spent much more time together. And of course the effect can change from controlling to protecting.» 
Job rotation to prevent this type of protection – or for example to prevent a situation where a prison 
guard can establish a large degree of power over one or more inmates – is not usual. Especially in the 
smaller prisons, which may employ as few as 10–12 people, it is difficult. However, the element of 
mutuality has experienced some changes during the last decades. This will be the theme of the next 
part of the paper. 
C h a n g e s  i n  t h e  N o r w e g i a n  p r i s o n  s y s t e m  
Opening the prisons: The import model. When asked what they consider as the major change in 
the Norwegian prison system during the last 30 years, the respondents’ answers vary. However they 
agree that there has been a change from a policy of self-sufficiency to an import model. Up to the early 
1970s the prisons were closed to the outside world. The internal staff and the prison officers 
themselves conducted all treatments and services. This policy was strongly criticized by some 
prominent professors at the Department of Criminology at Oslo University. They argued for opening 
up the prisons and the introduction of an import model (Christie 1969). This research group was 
central in The Norwegian Association for Penal Reform (KROM), founded in 1968, and which 
became a high profile non-governmental political organization and pressure group in the area of penal 
policy (Mathisen and Heli 1993). They argued that the prison in a much larger degree should become 
an arena for rehabilitation by opening it up to external groups offering education medical treatment, 
etc. The government white paper on prison and probation policy from 1977 represented a radical 
change in this direction (St.meld. nr. 104 (1977–78). Gradually educational and medical facilities were 
imported into the prison system. The managerial architect of the import model and one of our 
respondents remembers the time when prisons were closed systems, or, as he calls them, «impenetrable 
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fortresses». He considered it vital that the prisons became a part of society. As an assistant governor of 
Trondheim county jail in the early 1970s, he managed to get the education authorities to start a 
learning institution inside the jail. This was the first prison in Norway where inmates over the 
compulsory school age received education. When, some years later, he became assistant director in the 
Prison and probation department, he continued to import educational facilities in the various prisons. 
Being now responsible for all prisons and county jails, he travelled around and opened the prisons.  
«I started where the money was, that was in Stavanger. After that, we went to Bergen and 
Oslo. Today 4.500 inmates receive education during the year. We have almost 300 teachers.» 
When asked whether the import of education met opposition, he recalls some incidents. However,  
«… we had a very strong argument. It is very difficult to be against education. And this led to 
the Ministry of Education taking on both the financial, administrative and professional 
responsibility for the schooling of prison inmates. The next step was to achieve the same 
regarding medical services. And we succeeded. After that, we managed to get the culture 
authorities to start libraries inside the prisons. Today, 15 of the largest correctional facilities 
have their own library, managed by the State Library Supervision. It is a whole different 
world.» 
In 1988 the responsibility for the health care in prisons was transferred from the Ministry of Justice to 
the Ministry of Health. Today the biggest prisons have full time medical teams of doctors, nurses, 
psychologists and physiotherapists. There are also close relations between the prisons and 
employment centres, rehabilitation centres, libraries, the social welfare office, and the social insurance 
office. There has been a long cooperation with the Church of Norway that appoints prison chaplains. 
From 1995 the National Touring Theatre of Norway has regularly played small theatre performances 
in the prisons, and there are cooperation arrangements with local culture and sports authorities for 
arranging leisure activities for the inmates. Adding to this there is a growing social science research on 
the prison service system also representing a contribution to the extended external control through 
mutuality (Fridhov 1994, Johnsen 2001, Ravneberg 2002).  
Changes in management and control. Also with regard to management and control, there have 
been some major changes during the last 30 years. In the same way as the previous chapter, we will 
discuss the different control forms – oversight, contrived randomness and mutuality. The effect of 
these changes will then be discussed. 
Oversight. When we look at the central level’s control over the Norwegian prison system during the last 
decades, it becomes clear that there never has been a very strong and strict management from the 
department. One respondent assumes this is «a cultural thing». Another respondent calls the symptom 
for «Norwegian kindness», which means that although the department issues detailed and often 
quantitative guidelines, no sanctions are given when these guidelines or regulations are not followed. 
However, the financial management has become a little stricter during the last decade.  
«Until 1995 it was not very important whether you managed to hold the budget. But a change 
happened, and it became a bigger, more traumatic experience to not hold the budget than 
before. That does not mean that we could do whatever we wanted before 1995, but they [the 
Department of Justice and the Norwegian parliament] tolerated more.» 
Management by objectives and results (MBOR) has not been a large element of the management and 
control of the Norwegian prison system earlier, especially not the use of quantitative indicators. 
However, in one of the larger prisons, a project with balanced scored card started in 2001. This form 
of result management forces the prison management to prioritise goals and find a balance between all 
the guidelines and indicators that have to be followed. At the end of the project, all indicators have to 
be quantitative. This is supposed to enable the department to control the results in an easier way. 
Feedback on results, and sanctions when the results are not satisfying, is a necessary part of this 
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balanced result management. When functioning adequately, this form of management will improve 
the department’s possibilities for control and oversight of the prison system.  
Contrived randomness. The most important element in the random control of the Norwegian prison 
system, the Control Board, has existed continuously during the last decades. However, neither its form 
nor its function has changed dramatically. As the situation in the prisons improved, the complaints 
changed accordingly. As mentioned earlier, cases of serious abuse are rare, and most complaints deal 
with food or inmate privileges.  
As the prisons opened up to society, the relationship with the media changed accordingly. The media 
have found «a less black-white style» to write about prison management. There are more nuances, and 
their accounts have become much more accurate and fair. Because of the fact that the prisons now are 
open to «all kinds of civilians», the contrived randomness is higher than it was 30 years ago. 
Mutuality. Even though the negative effects of mutuality such as colleagues protecting instead of 
checking each other can still exist in the Norwegian prison system, some changes have happened 
during the last 30 years in order to diminish this problem, and to ensure the controlling effect of 
mutuality. One of them has been the introduction of female guards into the prison system. Three 
decades ago, there were almost no female employees inside the prison walls, except for some female 
nurses. Today, most prisons employ female guards, and this has together with the personal contract 
officer policy resulted in a reduction of the «old boys network», in which male guards can 
«overprotect» each other. «Female guards bring different norms and values into our system», one of 
our respondents remarks. Another change with regard to mutuality has to do with the employees’ 
education. 30 years ago, all prison guards were graduates from the only prison school in Norway. Also 
many of the supervisors and in some cases even the prison governors, who had started as prison 
guards, were graduates from this school. This of course meant that other influences did not penetrate 
the system to a large extent. The «inside protection» within the small group was high, everybody knew 
everybody, and loyalty was often necessary in order to stay in the system and to get promoted. 
Nowadays, even though the prison school is still the only place for future prison guards to receive 
their education, there is more variation in the educational background of the students and the school 
itself is changing towards more focus on the role as educator and therapist and less focus on the role 
as a jailer and guard trough a two years education (Ravneberg 2002). Furthermore, after the prisons 
and county jails were «opened to the society» in the 1980s, other professional groups, such as teachers, 
nurses, psychologists, library assistants and leisure activities consultant spent much time inside the 
prison walls. This reduces to a large degree the negative effects of internal mutuality, and can ensure 
the controlling factor. 
D i s c u s s i o n  
The case of prisons illustrate that important changes in the control have occurred over the past 
generation, but also that these changes might be more a result of substantive sector policy within this 
area than of a general and comprehensive administrative policy derived from the Government’s 
modernization programs. The policy of «opening up» the prisons based on a new prison policy 
characterized by treatment optimism and rehabilitation, is the most obvious example. This has 
brought new professions and external groups into the prisons and also changed the role of the prisons 
guards into prison officers with more educational and therapeutic tasks and with a higher variation in 
educational and professional background. There has been a professionalisation and feminisation 
process going on changing the role of the prison officer. Thus the control through mutuality and peer 
groups has changed from internal group processes towards external processes and is being based on 
new norms and values and also might been enhanced. At the same time the traditional control by 
contrived randomness through the activity of the control boards continues more or less as before. In 
spite of some criticism of the control board policy it has remained as a major control device.  
NO T A T  2 – 2003 CHANGING GOVERNMENT CONTROL  IN  NORWAY  
40  
There has been a general implementation deficit in the area of performan ce management. The effect 
of NPM-reforms by introducing MBOR with performance indicators, performance assessments, 
arms-length monitoring and standard setting seems to have been implemented in a «soft» way. It is 
more or less treated as a semi-manufactured method that has to be assembled and made ready for use 
locally. In this process the MBOR has to go through a compatibility test and is transformed so that it 
fits to the established working methods and administrative procedures in the prisons. Thus the co ntrol 
by oversight has not changed form controlling processes and procedures to controlling output and 
performance, but rather that the performance assessment is added to, or adopted to the process 
control. In this way the old public administration and the new public management melt together into a 
hybrid that is much less radical than the reform agents had intended. This also implies that the control 
forms not necessary appear in pure forms but often emerges as hybrids: group judgments and 
randomness, elements of peer groups and oversight. The discussion has also revealed that there are 
large variations between prisons to what extent they adapt new systems of performance management 
and prison service policies. This can be understood in the light of the strong tradition of independent 
prisons in Norway both vertically form the Ministry and horizontally form other prisons. But new 
prisons, with younger cohorts of prison officers and managers adapt more easily to the modern 
control and prison service policy enhanced by an active director general in the prison and probation 
department. 
Assessment of  contemporary control  system 
We have described and analyzed the effects of the revitalized control activities of the Norwegian 
parliament on the relationship between the legislature and the executive, on the internal workings of 
the high civil service and within two policy areas: the higher education and prison system. 
Furthermore, the question of whether these effects are constrained by NPM reforms in the civil 
service and of Norway’s adaptation to the EU has also been discussed.  
In accordance with a traditional control by oversight approach parliament has tried to reinstall its formal 
rights and authority as a controlling authority through the introduction of new control devices, such as 
public hearings and performance auditing. These new control instruments seem very much to be 
based on distrust towards the executive, thereby challenging the traditional Norwegian cultural-
institutional control tradition characterized by mutuality and internal, informal and trust-based 
identities and control.  
The constraints represented by NPM-oriented civil service reforms like MBOR and structural 
devolution, and increased integration into the EU through the EEA agreement has, however,  
undermined or weakened the effort to re-establish a strong hierarchical control of the executive by the 
parliament and also strengthened the role of the administrative leadership within the executive. It has 
introduced new forms of secondary oversight by more use of contract and contract -like arrangements, 
performance budgeting, performance pay and performance assessments and management more 
generally. The general trend moves from process control and rule following to output control and 
performance assessment. The external control from the EU through ESA stick, however, more to 
traditional oversight control by emphasizing procedure and rule following. 
This main change in control by oversight can also be seen in universities and prison services. The 
MBOR technique was made mandatory in all public administration authorities in Norway from 1991 
upon the introduction of activity planning, but as we have seen it has been implemented in a soft and 
mild way both in the university and in the prison area. There has been more focus on objectives than 
on performance assessments and the balance between decentralized autonomy and flexibility on the 
one hand and central control and scrutiny on the other has titled in favour of local autonomy. The 
main reason for this might be strong traditional values of professional autonomy in the university field 
and correspondingly a strong tradition of independent self-ruled prisons in the case of prison service 
CHANGING GOVERNMENT CONTROL  IN  NORWAY NO T A T  2 - 2003  
   41
administration. Adding to this the tasks of universities and prisons make it difficult to find reliable and 
valid quantitative performance indicators for the outcome of the services. This means that the MBOR 
is edited in a pragmatic local adaptation process to fit the existing managerial and control procedures. 
The new form of oversight has challenged the procedural oversight but in practice it rather add to the 
old form or combine with it than replaced it. 
The NPM control devises challenge the traditional Norwegian strong control by mutuality within the 
high civil service. Informal, indirect, internal and collegial control by peer groups and professional 
standards based on mutual trust has been supplemented by more use of formal, direct, external 
control through the use of experts on contract enforcements, performance indicators and 
assessments. This kind of control is more based on distrust. This being said, the absence of politicians 
in this kind of control is more in accordance with a cultural-institutional perspective with a traditional 
strong Norwegian civil service with great discretion. Mutuality has also been weakened in the area of 
university governance, but has been enhanced through the increasing use of peer review evaluations of 
disciplinary and departmental performance. In the prisons new forms of mutuality has emerged by 
opening up the prisons to different professional groups from other public authorities and from civil 
society and also because of changing the recruitment patterns and education of prison officers. Thus 
informal peer control changes as the peers change. 
The relevance of the competition  approach to control has been revealed through the revitalized scrutiny 
committee in the Storting, which has introduced new forms of specialization and interest 
constellations, but also through the existence of weak and shifting minority governments, adding to 
the increased pressure from parliament towards the executive. The absence of politicians in NPM 
control is in accordance with a competition approach focusing more on negotiations between 
different bureaucratic actors than between parliament and the executive. Competition has also been 
enhanced by the introduction of elements of performance pay and performance budgeting and by 
structural devolution and marketization of authorities that formerly were part of high civil service. 
Within the university field there has traditionally been competition for positions and research funds. 
This has now spread into university budgets, by introducing funding mechanisms based on candidate 
production. The element of competition is, however, generally weak in the prison services.  
These new control instruments seem to be very much based on distrust towards the executive, thereby 
challenging the traditional Norwegian cultural-institutional control tradition characterized by internal, 
informal and trust-based identities and control. They have also introduced a stronger emphasis on 
control by contrived randomness through public hearings, performance auditing and oral question time. 
Contrived randomness is a much more used control form in the relationship between parliament and 
the executive and high civil service than in the university field were this kind of control is almost 
absent. In the prison service contrived randomness is a traditional control form that still is popular. 
Summing up, this analysis illustrates the relevance of a combination of an oversight approach, 
competition, mutuality and contrived randomness in describing and understanding control 
instruments. The changes that we have observed do not primarily represent a change in the type of 
controls. The important changes are rather evident in the way in which existing control types are used 
and in the balance between them, but also in the composition of some of the control measures. More 
external oversight and oversight by performance assessments has been added to the traditional 
internal procedural oversight; and the content of mutuality has changed in the prisons from a closed 
group of colleagues protecting each other to opening up for mutual peers from outside. We have also 
revealed that in practice we often find combinations of different control measures rather than pure 
forms.  
The change in control is not only a result of an active administrative policy, but also reorganisation of 
the control function in the Storting, increased integration into the EU and substantive policy within 
the different areas contribute to the change in the control over the public sector. The effect of all 
these changes seems to be a general growth of control over time, first of all because enhanced use of 
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competition and oversight by performance assessments. In contrast to what one could expect from 
the decentralization and deregulation components of the NPM movement, there seems to have been 
an increase in the formality, the intensity and the complexity of control over the past 10 years. 
The conclusion is that our findings do not fit very well to our initial assumptions. First, there is a 
greater use of external control of the high civil service by parliament than we expected. Second, the 
prison service is more resistant to control form above and more open to external groups than we 
expected. Third, the universities are more open to control by competition in new areas and to new 
forms of oversight. This means that the traditional view of powerful high civil service, universities 
with strong professional autonomy and prisons as closed and loyal authorities in a bureaucracy with 
strong hierarchical authority need to be modified. The implication is that there is no single explanation 
of changing control patterns of public sector organizations. The changes that have taken place may be 
explained by a variety of factors, and we have to move towards a multi-causal theory to understand 
this kind of change processes. This will make the story less elegant, but in our view more realistic.  
A general reflection from this discussion is that there is a paradox or a dilemma in the legislative-
executive control function. On the one hand, the Storting, through its own internal reorganization has 
strengthened the focus on control by revitalizing the Scrutiny Committee, introducing public hearings, 
extending question time and expanding the audit function. On the other hand, both the active national 
NPM-inspired administrative policy, employing the instruments of structural devolution and MBOR,  
and the external environmental pressure exerted via increased integration in Europe through the EEA 
agreement reduce the scope for control by the Storting. Adding to this the media, after the 
deregulation of the media sector in the 1980s, have become a more important controller of public 
sector agencies, as illustrated both in the case of high civil service and the case of the prison service. 
The result for the Storting is more control over less; a more intense control focuses on a narrower 
sphere. The indirect effects of NPM reforms and the EEA agreement on parliamentarian control of 
the executive are that the control function has been challenged whilst the Storting has experienced 
more difficulty in controlling devolved state companies and more autonomous agencies and in 
handling rules and regulations issued by EU authorities. The Storting appears to have responded to 
this challenge by revitalizing its own control functions, thus compensating for the loss of control 
through devolution, MBOR and Europeanization (Nordby 2000). This general reflection cover, 
however, best the case of high civil service, and does not describe very well the policy areas of 
universities and prisons where the control focus of the Storting has been rather weak. What the net 
effect of these divergent processes will be remains to be seen. 
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